nature vs nurture research paper

Brain development and the nature versus nurture debate

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• 1 Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA. [email protected]
• PMID: 21489380
• DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53884-0.00015-4

Over the past three decades, developmental neurobiologists have made tremendous progress in defining basic principles of brain development. This work has changed the way we think about how brains develop. Thirty years ago, the dominant model was strongly deterministic. The relationship between brain and behavioral development was viewed as unidirectional; that is, brain maturation enables behavioral development. The advent of modern neurobiological methods has provided overwhelming evidence that it is the interaction of genetic factors and the experience of the individual that guides and supports brain development. Brains do not develop normally in the absence of critical genetic signaling, and they do not develop normally in the absence of essential environmental input. The fundamental facts about brain development should be of critical importance to neuropsychologists trying to understand the relationship between brain and behavioral development. However, the underlying assumptions of most contemporary psychological models reflect largely outdated ideas about how the biological system develops and what it means for something to be innate. Thus, contemporary models of brain development challenge the foundational constructs of the nature versus nurture formulation in psychology. The key to understanding the origins and emergence of both the brain and behavior lies in understanding how inherited and environmental factors are engaged in the dynamic and interactive processes that define and guide development of the neurobehavioral system.

Copyright © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Article contents

Nature and nurture as an enduring tension in the history of psychology.

• Hunter Honeycutt Hunter Honeycutt Bridgewater College, Department of Psychology
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190236557.013.518
• Published online: 30 September 2019

Nature–nurture is a dichotomous way of thinking about the origins of human (and animal) behavior and development, where “nature” refers to native, inborn, causal factors that function independently of, or prior to, the experiences (“nurture”) of the organism. In psychology during the 19th century, nature-nurture debates were voiced in the language of instinct versus learning. In the first decades of the 20th century, it was widely assumed that that humans and animals entered the world with a fixed set of inborn instincts. But in the 1920s and again in the 1950s, the validity of instinct as a scientific construct was challenged on conceptual and empirical grounds. As a result, most psychologists abandoned using the term instinct but they did not abandon the validity of distinguishing between nature versus nurture. In place of instinct, many psychologists made a semantic shift to using terms like innate knowledge, biological maturation, and/or hereditary/genetic effects on development, all of which extend well into the 21st century. Still, for some psychologists, the earlier critiques of the instinct concept remain just as relevant to these more modern usages.

The tension in nature-nurture debates is commonly eased by claiming that explanations of behavior must involve reference to both nature-based and nurture-based causes. However, for some psychologists there is a growing pressure to see the nature–nurture dichotomy as oversimplifying the development of behavior patterns. The division is seen as both arbitrary and counterproductive. Rather than treat nature and nurture as separable causal factors operating on development, they treat nature-nurture as a distinction between product (nature) versus process (nurture). Thus there has been a longstanding tension about how to define, separate, and balance the effects of nature and nurture.

• nature–nurture
• development
• nativism–empiricism
• innate–learned
• behavioral genetics
• epigenetics

Nature and Nurture in Development

The oldest and most persistent ways to frame explanations about the behavioral and mental development of individuals is to distinguish between two separate sources of developmental causation: (a) intrinsic, preformed, or predetermined causes (“nature”) versus (b) extrinsic, experiential, or environmental causes (“nurture”). Inputs from these two sources are thought to add their own contribution to development (see Figure 1 ).

Figure 1. The traditional view of nature and nurture as separate causes of development. In the traditional view, nature and nurture are treated as independent causal influences that combine during development to generate outcomes. Note that, during development, the effects of nature and nurture (shown in horizontal crossing lines) remain independent so that their effects on outcomes are theoretically separable.

Because some traits seem to derive more from one source than the other, much of the tension associated with the nature–nurture division deals with disagreements about how to balance the roles of nature and nurture in the development of a trait.

Evidence of Nature in Development

Evidence to support the nature–nurture division usually derives from patterns of behavior that suggest a limited role of environmental causation, thus implying some effect of nature by default. Table 1 depicts some common descriptors and conditions used to infer that some preference, knowledge, or skill is nature based.

Table 1. Common Descriptors and Associated Conditions for Inferring the Effects of Nature on Development

It is important to reiterate that nature-based causation (e.g., genetic determination) is inferred from these observations. Such inferences can generate tension because each of the observations listed here can be explained by nurture-based (environmental) factors. Confusion can also arise when evidence of one descriptor (e.g., being hereditary) is erroneously used to justify a different usage (e.g., that the trait is unlearned).

The Origins of Nature Versus Nurture

For much of recorded history, the distinction between nature and nurture was a temporal divide between what a person is innately endowed with at birth, prior to experience (nature), and what happens thereafter (nurture). It was not until the 19th century that the temporal division was transformed into a material division of causal influences (Keller, 2010 ). New views about heredity and Darwinian evolution justified distinguishing between native traits and genetic causes from acquired traits and environmental causes. More so than before, the terms nature and nurture were often juxtaposed in an opposition famously described by Sir Francis Galton ( 1869 ) as that between “nature versus nurture.”

Galton began writing about heredity in the mid-1860s. He believed we would discover laws governing the transmission of mental as well as physical qualities. Galton’s take on mental heredity, however, was forged by his desire to improve the human race in a science he would later call “eugenics.” In the mid- 19th century , British liberals assumed humans were equivalent at birth. Their social reform efforts were geared to enhancing educational opportunities and improving living conditions. Galton, a political conservative, opposed the notion of natural equality, arguing instead that people were inherently different at birth (Cowan, 2016 ), and that these inherited mental and behavioral inequalities were transmitted through lineages like physical qualities. Because Galton opposed the widely held Lamarckian idea that the qualities acquired in one’s lifetime could modify the inherited potential of subsequent generations, he believed long-lasting improvement of the human stock would only come by controlling breeding practices.

To explain the biological mechanisms of inheritance, Galton joined a growing trend in the 1870s to understand inheritance as involving the transmission of (hypothetical) determinative, germinal substances across generations. Foreshadowing a view that would later become scientific orthodoxy, Galton believed these germinal substances to be uninfluenced by the experiences of the organism. His theory of inheritance, however, was speculative. Realizing he was not equipped to fully explicate his theory of biological inheritance, Galton abandoned this line of inquiry by the end of that decade and refocused his efforts on identifying statistical laws of heredity of individual differences (Renwick, 2011 ).

Historians generally agree that Galton was the first to treat nature (as heredity) and nurture (everything else) as separate causal forces (Keller, 2010 ), but the schism gained biological legitimacy through the work of the German cytologist Auguste Weismann in the 1880s. Whereas Galton’s theory was motivated by his political agenda, Weismann was motivated by a scientific, theoretical agenda. Namely, Weismann opposed Lamarckian inheritance and promoted a view of evolution driven almost entirely by natural selection.

Drawing upon contemporary cytological and embryological research, Weismann made the case that the determinative substances found in the germ cells of plants and animals (called the “germ-plasm”) that are transmitted across generations were physically sequestered very early in embryogenesis and remained buffered from the other cells of the body (“somato-plasm”). This so-called, Weismann’s barrier meant that alterations in the soma that develop in the lifetime of the organism through the use or disuse of body parts would not affect the germinal substances transmitted during reproduction (see Winther, 2001 , for review). On this view, Lamarckian-style inheritance of acquired characteristics was not biologically possible.

Galton and Weismann’s influence on the life sciences cannot be overstated. Their work convinced many to draw unusually sharp distinctions between the inherited (nature) and the acquired (nurture). Although their theories were met with much resistance and generated significant tension in the life sciences from cytology to psychology, their efforts helped stage a new epistemic space through which to appreciate Mendel’s soon to be rediscovered breeding studies and usher in genetics (Muller-Wille & Rheinberger, 2012 ).

Ever since, psychology has teetered between nature-biased and nurture-biased positions. With the rise of genetics, the wedge between nature–nurture was deepened in the early to mid- 20th century , creating fields of study that focused exclusively on the effects of either nature or nurture.

The “Middle Ground” Perspective on Nature–Nurture

Twenty-first-century psychology textbooks often state that the nature–nurture debates have been resolved, and the tension relaxed, because we have moved on from emphasizing nature or nurture to appreciating that development necessarily involves both nature and nurture. In this middle-ground position, one asks how nature and nurture interact. For example, how do biological (or genetic) predispositions for behaviors or innate knowledge bias early learning experiences? Or how might environmental factors influence the biologically determined (maturational) unfolding of bodily form and behaviors?

Rejection of the Nature–Nurture Divide

For some, the “middle-ground” resolution is as problematic as “either/or” views and does not resolve a deeper source of tension inherent in the dichotomy. On this view, the nature–nurture divide is neither a legitimate nor a constructive way of thinking about development. Instead, developmental analysis reveals that the terms commonly associated with nature (e.g., innate, genetic, hereditary, or instinctual) and nurture (environmental or learned) are so entwined and confounded (and often arbitrary) that their independent effects cannot be meaningfully discussed. The nature–nurture division oversimplifies developmental processes, takes too much for granted, and ultimately hinders scientific progress. Thus not only is there a lingering tension about how to balance the effects of nature and nurture in the middle-ground view, but there is also a growing tension to move beyond the dichotomous nature–nurture framework.

Nativism in Behavior: Instincts

Definitions of instinct can vary tremendously, but many contrast (a) instinct with reason (or intellect, thought, will), which is related to but separable from contrasting (b) instinct with learning (or experience or habit).

Instinct in the Age of Enlightenment

Early usages of the instinct concept, following Aristotle, treated instinct as a mental, estimative faculty ( vis aestimativa or aestimativa naturalis ) in humans and animals that allowed for the judgments of objects in the world (e.g., seeing a predator) to be deemed beneficial or harmful in a way that transcends immediate sensory experience but does not involve the use of reason (Diamond, 1971 ). In many of the early usages, the “natural instinct” of animals even included subrational forms of learning.

The modern usage of instincts as unlearned behaviors took shape in the 17th century . By that point it was widely believed that nature or God had implanted in animals and humans innate behaviors and predispositions (“instincts”) to promote the survival of the individual and the propagation of the species. Disagreements arose as to whether instincts derived from innate mental images or were mindlessly and mechanically (physiologically) generated from innately specified bodily organization (Richards, 1987 ).

Anti-Instinct Movement in the Age of Enlightenment

Challenges to the instinct concept can be found in the 16th century (see Diamond, 1971 ), but they were most fully developed by empiricist philosophers of the French Sensationalist tradition in the 18th century (Richards, 1987 ). Sensationalists asserted that animals behaved rationally and all of the so-called instincts displayed by animals could be seen as intelligently acquired habits.

For Sensationalists, instincts, as traditionally understood, did not exist. Species-specificity in behavior patterns could be explained by commonalities in physiological organization, needs, and environmental conditions. Even those instinctual behaviors seen at birth (e.g., that newly hatched chicks peck and eat grain) might eventually be explained by the animal’s prenatal experiences. Erasmus Darwin ( 1731–1802 ), for example, speculated that the movements and swallowing experiences in ovo could account for the pecking and eating of grain by young chicks. The anti-instinct sentiment was clearly expressed by the Sensationalist Jean Antoine Guer ( 1713–1764 ), who warned that instinct was an “infantile idea” that could only be held by those who are ignorant of philosophy, that traditional appeals to instincts in animals not only explained nothing but served to hinder scientific explanations, and that nothing could be more superficial than to explain behavior than appealing to so-called instincts (Richards, 1987 ).

The traditional instinct concept survived. For most people, the complex, adaptive, species-specific behaviors displayed by naïve animals (e.g., caterpillars building cocoons; infant suckling behaviors) appeared to be predetermined and unlearned. Arguably as important, however, was the resistance to the theological implications of Sensationalist philosophy.

One of the strongest reactions to Sensationalism was put forward in Germany by Herman Samuel Reimarus ( 1694–1768 ). As a natural theologian, Reimarus, sought evidence of a God in the natural world, and the species-specific, complex, and adaptive instincts of animals seemed to stand as the best evidence of God’s work. More so than any other, Reimarus extensively catalogued instincts in humans and animals. Rather than treat instincts as behaviors, he defined instincts as natural impulses (inner drives) to act that were expressed perfectly, without reflection or practice, and served adaptive goals (Richards, 1987 ). He even proposed instincts for learning, a proposal that would resurface in the mid- 20th century , as would his drive theory of instinct (Jaynes & Woodward, 1974 ).

Partly as a result of Reimarus’ efforts, the instinct concept survived going into the 19th century . But many issues surrounding the instinct concept were left unsettled. How do instincts differ from reflexive behaviors? What role does learning play in the expression of instincts, if any? Do humans have more or fewer instincts than animals? These questions would persist well into the first decades of the 20th century and ultimately fuel another anti-instinct movement.

Instinct in the 19th Century

In the 19th century , the tension about the nature and nurture of instincts in the lifetime of animals led to debates about the nature and nurture of instincts across generations . These debates dealt with whether instincts should be viewed as “inherited habits” from previous generations or whether they result from the natural selection. Debating the relative roles of neo-Lamarckian use-inheritance versus neo-Darwinian natural selection in the transmutation of species became a significant source of tension in the latter half of the 19th century . Although the neo-Lamarckian notion of instincts as being inherited habits was rejected in the 20th century , it has resurged in recent years (e.g., see Robinson & Barron, 2017 ).

Darwinian evolutionary theory required drawing distinctions between native and acquired behaviors, and, perhaps more so than before, behaviors were categorized along a continuum from the purely instinctive (unlearned), to the partially instinctive (requiring some learning), to the purely learned. Still, it was widely assumed that a purely instinctive response would be modified by experience after its first occurrence. As a result, instinct and habit were very much entangled in the lifetime of the organism. The notion of instincts as fixed and unmodifiable would not be widely advanced until after the rise of Weismann’s germ-plasm theory in the late 19thcentury .

Given their importance in evolutionary theory, there was greater interest in more objectively identifying pure instincts beyond anecdotal reports. Some of the most compelling evidence was reported by Douglas Spalding ( 1844–1877 ) in the early 1870s (see Gray, 1967 ). Spalding documented numerous instances of how naïve animals showed coordinated, seemingly adaptive responses (e.g., hiding) to objects (e.g., sight of predators) upon their first encounter, and he helped pioneer the use of the deprivation experiment to identify instinctive behaviors. This technique involved selectively depriving young animals of seemingly critical learning experiences or sensory stimulation. Should animals display some species-typical action following deprivation, then, presumably, the behavior could be labeled as unlearned or innate. In all, these studies seemed to show that animals displayed numerous adaptive responses at the very start, prior to any relevant experience. In a variety of ways, Spalding’s work anticipated 20th-century studies of innate behavior. Not only would the deprivation experiment be used as the primary means of detecting native tendencies by European zoologists and ethologists, but Spalding also showed evidence of what would later be called imprinting, critical period effects and evidence of behavioral maturation.

Reports of pure instinct did not go unchallenged. Lloyd Morgan ( 1896 ) questioned the accuracy of these reports in his own experimental work with young animals. In some cases, he failed to replicate the results and in other cases he found that instinctive behaviors were not as finely tuned to objects in the environment as had been claimed. Morgan’s research pointed to taking greater precision in identifying learned and instinctive components of behavior, but, like most at the turn of the 20th century , he did not question that animal behavior involved both learned and instinctive elements.

A focus on instinctive behaviors intensified in the 1890s as Weismann’s germ-plasm theory grew in popularity. More so than before, a sharp distinction was drawn between native and acquired characteristics, including behavior (Johnston, 1995 ). Although some psychologists continued to maintain neo-Lamarckian notions, most German (Burnham, 1972 ) and American (Cravens & Burnham, 1971 ) psychologists were quick to adopt Weismann’s theory. They envisioned a new natural science of psychology that would experimentally identify the germinally determined, invariable set of native psychological traits in species and their underlying physiological (neural) basis. However, whereas English-speaking psychologists tended to focus on how this view impacted our understanding of social institutions and its social implications, German psychologists were more interested in the longstanding philosophical implications of Weismann’s doctrine as it related to the differences (if any) between man and beast (Burnham, 1972 ).

Some anthropologists and sociologists, however, interpreted Weismann’s theory quite differently and used it elevate sociology as its own scientific discipline. In the 1890s, the French sociologist Emil Durkheim, for example, interpreted Weismann’s germinal determinants as a generic force on human behavior that influenced the development of general predispositions that are molded by the circumstances of life (Meloni, 2016 ). American anthropologists reached similar conclusions in the early 20th century (Cravens & Burnham, 1971 ). Because Weismann’s theory divorced biological inheritance from social inheritance, and because heredity was treated as a generic force, sociologists felt free to study social (eventually, “cultural”) phenomena without reference to biological or psychological concerns.

Anti-Instinct Movement in the 1920s

Despite their differences, in the first two decades of the 20th century both psychologists and sociologists generally assumed that humans and animals had some native tendencies or instincts. Concerns were even voiced that instinct had not received enough attention in psychology. Disagreements about instincts continued to focus on (the now centuries old debates of) how to conceptualize them. Were they complex reflexes, impulses, or motives to act, or should instinct be a mental faculty (like intuition), separate from reasoning and reflex (Herrnstein, 1972 )?

In America, the instinct concept came under fire following a brief paper in 1919 by Knight Dunlap titled “Are There Any Instincts?” His primary concern dealt with teleological definitions of instincts in which an instinct referred to all the activities involved in obtaining some end-state (e.g., instincts of crying, playing, feeding, reproduction, war, curiosity, or pugnacity). Defined in this way, human instincts were simply labels for human activities, but how these activities were defined was arbitrarily imposed by the researchers. Is feeding, for instance, an instinct, or is it composed of more basic instincts (like chewing and swallowing)? The arbitrariness of classifying human behavior had led to tremendous inconsistencies and confusion among psychologists.

Not all of the challenges to instinct dealt with its teleological usage. Some of the strongest criticisms were voiced by Zing-Yang Kuo throughout the 1920s. Kuo was a Chinese animal psychologist who studied under Charles Tolman at the University of California, Berkeley. Although Kuo’s attacks on instinct changed throughout the 1920s (see Honeycutt, 2011 ), he ultimately argued that all behaviors develop in experience-dependent ways and that appeals to instinct were statements of ignorance about how behaviors develop. Like Dunlap, he warned that instincts were labels with no explanatory value. To illustrate, after returning to China, he showed how the so-called rodent-killing instinct in cats often cited by instinct theorists is not found in kittens that are reared with rodents (Kuo, 1930 ). These kittens, instead, became attached to the rodents, and they resisted attempts to train rodent-killing. Echoing the point made by Guer, Kuo claimed that appeals to instinct served to stunt scientific inquiry into the developmental origins of behavior.

But Kuo did not just challenge the instinct concept. He also argued against labeling behaviors as “learned.” After all, whether an animal “learns” depends on the surrounding environmental conditions, the physiological and developmental status of the animal, and, especially, the developmental (or experiential) history of that animal. Understanding learning also required developmental analysis. Thus Kuo targeted the basic distinction between nature and nurture, and he was not alone in doing so (e.g., see Carmichael, 1925 ), but his call to reject it did not spread to mainstream American psychologists.

By the 1930s, the term instinct had fallen into disrepute in psychology, but experimental psychologists (including behaviorists) remained committed to a separation of native from acquired traits. If anything, the dividing line between native and acquired behaviors became more sharply drawn than before (Logan & Johnston, 2007 ). For some psychologists, instinct was simply rebranded in the less contentious (but still problematic) language of biological drives or motives (Herrnstein, 1972 ). Many other psychologists simply turned to describing native traits as due to “maturation” and/or “heredity” rather than “instinct.”

Fixed Action Patterns

The hereditarian instinct concept received a reboot in Europe in the 1930s with the rise of ethology led by Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, and others. Just as animals inherit organs that perform specific functions, ethologists believed animals inherit behaviors that evolved to serve adaptive functions as well. Instincts were described as unlearned (inherited), blind, stereotyped, adaptive, fixed action patterns, impervious to change that are initiated (released) by specific stimuli in the environment.

Ethologists in 1930s and 1940s were united under the banner of innateness. They were increasingly critical of the trend by American psychologists (i.e., behaviorists) to focus on studying on how a limited number of domesticated species (e.g., white rat) responded to training in artificial settings (Burkhardt, 2005 ). Ethologists instead began with rich descriptions of animal behavior in more natural environments along with detailed analyses of the stimulus conditions that released the fixed action patterns. To test whether behavioral components were innate, ethologists relied primarily on the deprivation experiment popularized by Spalding in the 19th century . Using these methods (and others), ethologists identified numerous fascinating examples of instinctive behaviors, which captured mainstream attention.

In the early 1950s, shortly after ethology had gained professional status (Burkhardt, 2005 ), a series of challenges regarding instinct and innateness were put forth by a small cadre of North American behavioral scientists (e.g., T. C. Schneirla, Donald Hebb, Frank Beach). Arguably the most influential critique was voiced by comparative psychologist Daniel Lehrman ( 1953 ), who presented a detailed and damning critique of deprivation experiments on empirical and logical grounds. Lehrman explained that deprivation experiments isolate the animal from some but not all experiences. Thus deprivation experiments simply change what an animal experiences rather than eliminating experience altogether, and so they cannot possibly determine whether a behavior is innate (independent of experience). Instead, these experiments show what environmental conditions do not matter in the development of a behavior but do not speak to what conditions do matter .

Lehrman went on to argue that the whole endeavor to identify instinctive or innate behavior was misguided from the start. All behavior, according to Lehrman, develops from a history of interactions between an organism and its environment. If a behavior is found to develop in the absence of certain experiences, the researcher should not stop and label it as innate. Rather, research should continue to identify the conditions under which the behavior comes about. In line with Kuo, Lehrman repeated the warning that to label something as instinctive (or inherited or maturational) is a statement of ignorance about how that behavior develops and does more to stunt than promote research.

Lehrman’s critique created significant turmoil among ethologists. As a result, ethologists took greater care in using the term innate , and it led to new attempts to synthesize or re-envision learning and instinct .

Some of these attempts focused on an increased role for learning and experience in the ontogeny of species-typical behaviors. These efforts spawned significant cross-talk between ethologists and comparative psychologists to more thoroughly investigate behavioral development under natural conditions. Traditional appeals to instinct and learning (as classical and operant conditioning) were both found to be inadequate for explaining animal behavior. In their stead, these researchers focused more closely on how anatomical, physiological, experiential, and environmental conditions influenced the development of species-typical behaviors.

Tinbergen ( 1963 ) was among those ethologists who urged for greater developmental analysis of species-typical behaviors, and he included it as one of his four problems in the biological study of organisms, along with causation (mechanism), survival value (function), and evolution. Of these four problems, Tinbergen believed ethologists were especially well suited to study survival value, which he felt had been seriously neglected (Burkhardt, 2005 ).

The questions of survival value coupled with models of population genetics would gain significant momentum in the 1960s and 1970s in England and the United States with the rise of behavioral ecology and sociobiology (Griffiths, 2008 ). But because these new fields seemed to promote some kind of genetic determinism in behavioral development, they were met with much resistance and reignited a new round of nature–nurture debates in the 1970s (see Segerstrale, 2000 ).

However, not all ethologists abandoned the instinct concept. Lorenz, in particular, continued to defend the division between nature and nurture. Rather than speaking of native and acquired behaviors, Lorenz later spoke of two different sources of information for behavior (innate/genetic vs. acquired/environmental), which was more a subtle shift in language than it was an actual change in theory, as Lehrman later pointed out.

Some ethologists followed Lorenz’s lead and continued to maintain more of a traditional delineation between instinct and learning. Their alternative synthesis viewed learning as instinctive (Gould & Marler, 1987 ). They proposed that animals have evolved domain-specific “instincts to learn” that result from the its genetic predispositions and innate knowledge. To support the idea of instincts for learning, ethologists pointed to traditional ethological findings (on imprinting and birdsong learning), but they also drew from the growing body of work in experimental psychology that seemed to indicate certain types of biological effects on learning.

Biological Constraints and Preparedness

While ethology was spreading in Europe in the 1930s–1950s, behaviorism reigned in the United States. Just as ethologists were confronted with including a greater role of nurture in their studies, behaviorists were challenged to consider a greater role of nature.

Behaviorists assumed there to be some behavioral innateness (e.g., fixed action patterns, unconditioned reflexes, primary reinforcers and drives). But because behaviorists focused on learning, they tended to study animals in laboratory settings using biologically (or ecologically) irrelevant stimuli and responses to minimize any role of instinct (Johnston, 1981 ). It was widely assumed that these studies would identify general laws of learning that applied to all species regardless of the specific cues, reinforcers, and responses involved.

Challenges to the generality assumption began to accumulate in the 1960s. Some studies pointed to failures that occurred during conditioning procedures. Breland and Breland ( 1961 ), for example, reported that some complex behaviors formed through operant conditioning would eventually become “displaced” by conditioned fixed action patterns in a phenomenon they called “instinctive drift.” Studies of taste-aversion learning (e.g., Garcia & Koelling, 1966 ) also reported the failure of rats to associate certain events (e.g., flavors with shock or audiovisual stimuli with toxicosis).

Other studies were pointing to enhanced learning. In particular, it was found that rats could form strong conditioned taste aversions after only a single pairing between a novel flavor and illness. (This rapid “one trial learning” was a major focus in the research from Niko Tinbergen’s ethological laboratory.) Animals, it seemed, had evolved innate predispositions to form (or not form) certain associations.

In humans, studies of biological constraints on learning were mostly limited to fear conditioning. Evidence indicated that humans conditioned differently to (biologically or evolutionarily) fear-relevant stimuli like pictures of spiders or snakes than to fear-irrelevant stimuli like pictures of mushrooms or flowers (Ohman, Fredrikson, Hugdahl, & Rimmö, 1976 ).

These findings and others were treated as a major problem in learning theory and led to calls for a new framework to study learning from a more biologically oriented perspective that integrated the evolutionary history and innate predispositions of the species. These predispositions were described as biological “constraints” on, “preparedness,” or “adaptive specializations” for learning, all of which were consistent with the “instincts to learn” framework proposed by ethologists.

By the 1980s it was becoming clear that the biological preparedness/constraint view of learning suffered some limitations. For example, what constraints count as “biological” was questioned. It was well established that there were general constraints on learning associated with the intensity, novelty, and timing of stimuli. But, arbitrarily it seemed, these constraints were not classified as “biological” (Domjan & Galef, 1983 ). Other studies of “biological constraints” found that 5- and 10-day old rats readily learned to associated a flavor with shock (unlike in adults), but (like in adults) such conditioning was not found in 15-day-old rats (Hoffman & Spear, 1988 ). In other words, the constraint on learning was not present in young rats but developed later in life, suggesting a possible role of experience in bringing about the adult-like pattern.

Attempts to synthesize these alternatives led to numerous calls for more ecologically oriented approaches to learning not unlike the synthesis between ethology and comparative psychology in the 1960s. All ecological approaches to learning proposed that learning should be studied in the context of “natural” (recurrent and species-typical) problems that animals encounter (and have evolved to encounter) using ecologically meaningful stimuli and responses. Some argued (e.g., Johnston, 1981 ) that studies of learning should take place within the larger context of studying how animals develop and adapt to their surround. Others (Domjan & Galef, 1983 ) pointed to more of a comparative approach in studying animal learning in line with behavioral ecology that takes into account how learning can be influenced by the possible selective pressures faced by each species. Still, how to synthesize biological constraints (and evolutionary explanations) on learning with a general process approach remains a source of tension in experimental psychology.

Nativism in Mind: Innate Ideas

Nativism and empiricism in philosophy.

In the philosophy of mind, nature–nurture debates are voiced as debates between nativists and empiricists. Nativism is a philosophical position that holds that our minds have some innate (a priori to experience) knowledge, concepts, or structure at the very start of life. Empiricism, in contrast, holds that all knowledge derives from our experiences in the world.

However, rarely (if ever) were there pure nativist or empiricist positions, but the positions bespeak a persistent tension. Empiricists tended to eschew innateness and promote a view of the mental content that is built by general mechanisms (e.g., association) operating on sensory experiences, whereas nativists tend to promote a view of mind that contains domain-specific, innate processes and/or content (Simpson, Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2005 ). Although the tension about mental innateness would loosen as empiricism gained prominence in philosophy and science, the strain never went away and would intensify again in the 20th century .

Nativism in 20th Century Psychology: The Case of Language Development

In the first half of the 20th century , psychologists generally assumed that knowledge was gained or constructed through experience with the world. This is not to say that psychologists did not assume some innate knowledge. The Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, for example, believed infants enter the world with some innate knowledge structures, particularly as they relate to early sensory and motor functioning (see Piaget, 1971 ). But the bulk of his work dealt with the construction of conceptual knowledge as children adapt to their worlds. By and large, there were no research programs in psychology that sought to identify innate factors in human knowledge and cognition until the 1950s (Samet & Zaitchick, 2017 )

An interest in psychological nativism was instigated in large part by Noam Chomsky’s ( 1959 ) critique of B. F. Skinner’s book on language. To explain the complexity of language, he argued, we must view language as the knowledge and application of grammatical rules. He went on to claim that the acquisition of these rules could not be attributed to any general-purpose, learning process (e.g., reinforcement). Indeed, language acquisition occurs despite very little explicit instruction. Moreover, language is special in terms of its complexity, ease, and speed of acquisition by children and in its uniqueness to humans. Instead, he claimed that our minds innately contain some language-specific knowledge that kick-starts and promotes language acquisition. He later claimed this knowledge can be considered some sort of specialized mental faculty or module he called the “language acquisition device” (Chomsky, 1965 ) or what Pinker ( 1995 ) later called the “language instinct.”

To support the idea of linguistic nativism, Chomsky and others appealed to the poverty of the stimulus argument. In short, this argument holds that our experiences in life are insufficient to explain our knowledge and abilities. When applied to language acquisition, this argument holds children’s knowledge of language (grammar) goes far beyond the limited, and sometimes broken, linguistic events that children directly encounter. Additional evidence for nativism drew upon the apparent maturational quality of language development. Despite wide variations in languages and child-rearing practices across the world, the major milestones in language development appear to unfold in children in a universal sequence and timeline, and some evidence suggested a critical period for language acquisition.

Nativist claims about language sparked intense rebuttals by empiricist-minded psychologists and philosophers. Some of these retorts tackled the logical limitations of the poverty of stimulus argument. Others pointed to the importance of learning and social interaction in driving language development, and still others showed that language (grammatical knowledge) may not be uniquely human (see Tomasello, 1995 , for review). Nativists, in due course, provided their own rebuttals to these challenges, creating a persistent tension in psychology.

Extending Nativism Beyond Language Development

In the decades that followed, nativist arguments expanded beyond language to include cognitive domains that dealt with understanding the physical, psychological, and social worlds. Developmental psychologists were finding that infants appeared to be much more knowledgeable in cognitive tasks (e.g., on understanding object permanence) and skillful (e.g., in imitating others) than had previously been thought, and at much younger ages. Infants also showed a variety of perceptual biases (e.g., preference for face-like stimuli over equally complex non-face-like stimuli) from very early on. Following the standard poverty of the stimulus argument, these findings were taken as evidence that infants enter the world with some sort of primitive, innate, representational knowledge (or domain-specific neural mechanisms) that constrains and promotes subsequent cognitive development. The nature of this knowledge (e.g., as theories or as core knowledge), however, continues to be debated (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007 ).

Empiricist-minded developmental psychologists responded by demonstrating shortcomings in the research used to support nativist claims. For example, in studies of infants’ object knowledge, the behavior of infants (looking time) in nativist studies could be attributed to relatively simple perceptual processes rather than to the infants’ conceptual knowledge (Heyes, 2014 ). Likewise, reports of human neonatal imitation not only suffered from failures to replicate but could be explained by simpler mechanisms (e.g., arousal) than true imitation (Jones, 2017 ). Finally, studies of perceptual preferences found in young infants, like newborn preferences for face-like stimuli, may not be specific preferences for faces per se but instead may reflect simpler, nonspecific perceptual biases (e.g., preferences for top-heavy visual configurations and congruency; Simion & Di Giorgio, 2015 ).

Other arguments from empiricist-minded developmental psychologists focused on the larger rationale for inferring innateness. Even if it is conceded that young infants, like two-month-olds, or even two-day-olds, display signs of conceptual knowledge, there is no good evidence to presume the knowledge is innate. Their knowledgeable behaviors could still be seen as resulting from their experiences (many of which may be nonobvious to researchers) leading up to the age of testing (Spencer et al., 2009 ).

In the 21st century , there is still no consensus about the reality, extensiveness, or quality of mental innateness. If there is innate knowledge, can experience add new knowledge or only expand the initial knowledge? Can the doctrine of innate knowledge be falsified? There are no agreed-upon answers to these questions. The recurring arguments for and against mental nativism continue to confound developmental psychologists.

Maturation Theory

The emergence of bodily changes and basic behavioral skills sometimes occurs in an invariant, predictable, and orderly sequence in a species despite wide variations in rearing conditions. These observations are often attributed to the operation of an inferred, internally driven, maturational process. Indeed, 21st-century textbooks in psychology commonly associate “nature” with “maturation,” where maturation is defined as the predetermined unfolding of the individual from a biological or genetic blueprint. Environmental factors play a necessary, but fundamentally supportive, role in the unfolding of form.

Preformationism Versus Epigenesis in the Generation of Form

The embryological generation of bodily form was debated in antiquity but received renewed interest in the 17th century . Following Aristotle, some claimed that embryological development involved “epigenesis,” defined as the successive emergence of form from a formless state. Epigenesists, however, struggled to explain what orchestrated development without appealing to Aristotelean souls. Attempts were made to invoke to natural causes like physical and chemical forces, but, despite their best efforts, the epigenesists were forced to appeal to the power of presumed, quasi-mystical, vitalistic forces (entelechies) that directed development.

The primary alternative to epigenesis was “preformationism,” which held that development involved the growth of pre-existing form from a tiny miniature (homunculus) that formed immediately after conception or was preformed in the egg or sperm. Although it seems reasonable to guess that the invention and widespread use of the microscope would immediately lay to rest any claim of homuncular preformationism, this was not the case. To the contrary, some early microscopists claimed to see signs of miniature organisms in sperm or eggs, and failures to find these miniatures were explained away (e.g., the homunculus was transparent or deflated to the point of being unrecognizable). But as microscopes improved and more detailed observations of embryological development were reported in the late 18th and 19th centuries , homuncular preformationism was finally refuted.

From Preformationism to Predeterminism

Despite the rejection of homuncular preformationism, preformationist appeals can be found throughout the 19th century . One of the most popular preformationist theories of embryological development was put forth by Ernst Haeckel in the 1860s (Gottlieb, 1992 ). He promoted a recapitulation theory (not original to Haeckel) that maintained that the development of the individual embryo passes through all the ancestral forms of its species. Ontogeny was thought to be a rapid, condensed replay of phylogeny. Indeed, for Haeckel, phylogenesis was the mechanical cause of ontogenesis. The phylogenetic evolution of the species created the maturational unfolding of embryonic form. Exactly how this unfolding takes place was less important than its phylogenetic basis.

Most embryologists were not impressed with recapitulation theory. After all, the great embryologist Karl Ernst von Baer ( 1792–1876 ) had refuted strict recapitulation decades earlier. Instead, there was greater interest in how best to explain the mechanical causes of development ushering in a new “experimental embryology.” Many experimental embryologists followed the earlier epigenesists by discussing vitalistic forces operating on the unorganized zygote. But it soon became clear that the zygote was structured, and many people believed the zygote contained special (unknown) substances that specified development. Epigenesis-minded experimental embryologists soon warned that the old homuncular preformationism was being transformed into a new predetermined preformationism.

As a result, the debates between preformationism and epigenesis were reignited in experimental embryology, but the focus of these debates shifted to the various roles of nature and nurture during development. More specifically, research focused on the extent to which early cellular differentiation was predetermined by factors internal to cells like chromosomes or cytoplasm (preformationism, nature) or involved factors (e.g., location) outside of the cell (epigenesis, nurture). The former emphasized reductionism and developmental programming, whereas the latter emphasized some sort of holistic, regulatory system responsive to internal and external conditions. The tension between viewing development as predetermined or “epigenetic” persists into the 21st century .

Preformationism gained momentum in the 20th century following the rediscovery of Mendel’s studies of heredity and the rapid rise of genetics, but not because of embryological research on the causes of early differentiation. Instead, preformationism prevailed because it seemed embryological research on the mechanisms of development could be ignored in studies of hereditary patterns.

The initial split between heredity and development can be found in Galton’s speculations but is usually attributed to Weismann’s germ-plasm theory. Weismann’s barrier seemed to posit that the germinal determinants present at conception would be the same, unaltered determinants transmitted during reproduction. This position, later dubbed as “Weismannism,” was ironically not one promoted by Weismann. Like nearly all theorists in the 19th century , he viewed the origins of variation and heredity as developmental phenomena (Amundson, 2005 ), and he claimed that the germ-plasm could be directly modified in the lifetime of the organism by environmental (e.g., climactic and dietary) conditions (Winther, 2001 ). Still, Weismann’s theory treated development as a largely predetermined affair driven by inherited, germinal determinants buffered from most developmental events. As such, it helped set the stage for a more formal divorce between heredity and development with the rise of Mendelism in the early 20th century .

Mendel’s theory of heredity was exceptional in how it split development from heredity (Amundson, 2005 ). More so than in Weismann’s theory, Mendel’s theory assumed that the internal factors that determine form and are transmitted across generations remain unaltered in the lifetime of the organism. To predict offspring outcomes, one need only know the combination of internal factors present at conception and their dominance relations. Exactly how these internal factors determined form could be disregarded. The laws of hereditary transmission of the internal factors (e.g., segregation) did not depend on the development or experiences of the organism or the experiences the organism’s ancestors. Thus the experimental study of heredity (i.e., breeding) could proceed without reference to ancestral records or embryological concerns (Amundson, 2000 ). By the mid-1920s, the Mendelian factors (now commonly called “genes”) were found to be structurally arranged on chromosomes, and the empirical study of heredity (transmission genetics) was officially divorced from studies of development.

The splitting of heredity and development found in Mendel’s and Weismann’s work met with much resistance. Neo-Lamarckian scientists, especially in the United States (Cook, 1999 ) and France (Loison, 2011 ), sought unsuccessfully to experimentally demonstrate the inheritance of acquired characteristics into the 1930s.

In Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, resistance to Mendelism dealt with the chromosomal view of Mendelian heredity championed by American geneticists who were narrowly focused on studying transmission genetics at the expense of developmental genetics. German biologists, in contrast, were much more interested in the broader roles of genes in development (and evolution). In trying to understand how genes influence development, particularly of traits of interest to embryologists, they found the Mendelian theory to be lacking. In the decades between the world wars, German biologists proposed various expanded views of heredity that included some form of cytoplasmic inheritance (Harwood, 1985 ).

Embryologists resisted the preformationist view of development throughout the early to mid- 20th century , often maintaining no divide between heredity and development, but their objections were overshadowed by genetics and its eventual synthesis with evolutionary theory. Consequently, embryological development was treated by geneticists and evolutionary biologists as a predetermined, maturational process driven by internal, “genetic” factors buffered from environmental influence.

Maturation Theory in Psychology

Maturation theory was applied to behavioral development in the 19th century in the application of Haeckel’s recapitulation theory. Some psychologists believed that the mental growth of children recapitulated the history of the human race (from savage brute to civilized human). With this in mind, many people began to more carefully document child development. Recapitulationist notions were found in the ideas of many notable psychologists in the 19th and early 20th centuries (e.g., G. S. Hall), and, as such, the concept played an important role in the origins of developmental psychology (Koops, 2015 ). But for present purposes what is most important is that children’s mental and behavioral development was thought to unfold via a predetermined, maturational process.

With the growth of genetics, maturational explanations were increasingly invoked to explain nearly all native and hereditary traits. As the instinct concept lost value in the 1920s, maturation theory gained currency, although the shift was largely a matter of semantics. For many psychologists, the language simply shifted from “instinct versus learning” to “maturation versus practice/experience” (Witty & Lehman, 1933 ).

Initial lines of evidence for maturational explanations of behavior were often the same as those that justified instinct and native traits, but new embryological research presented in the mid-1920s converged to show support for strict maturational explanations of behavioral development. In these experiments (see Wyman, 2005 , for review), spanning multiple laboratories, amphibians (salamanders and frogs) were exposed to drugs that acted as anesthetics and/or paralytics throughout the early stages of development, thus reducing sensory experience and/or motor practice. Despite the reduced sensory experiences and being unable to move, these animals showed no delays in the onset of motor development once the drugs wore off.

This maturational account of motor development in amphibians fit well with contemporaneous studies of motor development in humans. The orderly, invariant, and predictable (age-related) sequential appearance of motor skills documented in infants reared under different circumstances (in different countries and across different decades) was seen as strong evidence for a maturational account. Additional evidence was reported by Arnold Gessell and Myrtle McGraw, who independently presented evidence in the 1920s to show that the pace and sequence of motor development in infancy were not altered by special training experiences. Although the theories of these maturation theorists were more sophisticated when applied to cognitive development, their work promoted a view in which development was primarily driven by neural maturation rather than experience (Thelen, 2000 ).

Critical and Sensitive Periods

As the maturation account of behavioral development gained ground, it became clear that environmental input played a more informative role than had previously been thought. Environmental factors were found to either disrupt or induce maturational changes at specific times during development. Embryological research suggested that there were well-delineated time periods of heightened sensitivity in which specific experimental manipulations (e.g., tissue transplantations) could induce irreversible developmental changes, but the same manipulation would have no effect outside of that critical period.

In the 1950s–1960s a flurry of critical period effects were reported in birds and mammals across a range of behaviors including imprinting, attachment, socialization, sensory development, bird song learning, and language development (Michel & Tyler, 2005 ). Even though these findings highlighted an important role of experience in behavioral development, evidence of critical periods was usually taken to imply some rigid form of biological determinism (Oyama, 1979 ).

As additional studies were conducted on critical period effects, it became clear that many of the reported effects were more gradual, variable, experience-dependent, and not necessarily as reversible as was previously assumed. In light of these reports, there was a push in the 1970s (e.g., Connolly, 1972 ) to substitute “sensitive period” for “critical period” to avoid the predeterminist connotations associated with the latter and to better appreciate that these periods simply describe (not explain) certain temporal aspects of behavioral development. As a result, a consensus emerged that behaviors should not be attributed to “time” or “age” but to the developmental history and status of the animal under investigation (Michel & Tyler, 2005 ).

Heredity and Genetics

In the decades leading up to and following the start of the 20th century , it was widely assumed that many psychological traits (not just instincts) were inherited or “due to heredity,” although the underlying mechanisms were unknown. Differences in intelligence, personality, and criminality within and between races and sexes were largely assumed to be hereditary and unalterable by environmental intervention (Gould, 1996 ). The evidence to support these views in humans was often derived from statistical analyses of how various traits tended to run in families. But all too frequently, explanations of data were clouded by pre-existing, hereditarian assumptions.

Human Behavioral Genetics

The statistical study of inherited human (physical, mental, and behavioral) differences was pioneered by Galton ( 1869 ). Although at times Galton wrote that nature and nurture were so intertwined as to be inseparable, he nevertheless devised statistical methods to separate their effects. In the 1860s and 1870s, Galton published reports purporting to show how similarities in intellect (genius, talent, character, and eminence) in European lineages appeared to be a function of degree of relatedness. Galton considered, but dismissed, environmental explanations of his data, leading him to confirm his belief that nature was stronger than nurture.

Galton also introduced the use of twin studies to tease apart the relative impact of nature versus nurture, but the twin method he used was markedly different from later twin studies used by behavioral geneticists. Galton tracked the life history of twins who were judged to be very similar or very dissimilar near birth (i.e., by nature) to test the power of various postnatal environments (nurture) that might make them more or less similar over time. Here again, Galton concluded that nature overpowers nurture.

Similar pedigree (e.g., the Kallikak study; see Zenderland, 2001 ) and twin studies appeared in the early 1900s, but the first adoption study and the modern twin method (which compares monozygotic to dizygotic twin pairs) did not appear until the 1920s (Rende, Plomin, & Vandenberg, 1990 ). These reports led to a flurry of additional work on the inheritance of mental and behavioral traits over the next decade.

Behavioral genetic research peaked in the 1930s but rapidly lost prominence due in large part to its association with the eugenics movement (spearheaded by Galton) but also because of the rise and eventual hegemony of behaviorism and the social sciences in the United States. Behavioral genetics resurged in the 1960s with the rising tide of nativism in psychology, and returned to its 1930s-level prominence in the 1970s (McGue & Gottesman, 2015 ).

The resurgence brought with a new statistical tool: the heritability statistic. The origins of heritability trace back to early attempts to synthesize Mendelian genetics with biometrics by Ronald Fisher and others. This synthesis ushered in a new field of quantitative genetics and it marked a new way of thinking about nature and nurture. The shift was to no longer think about nature and nurture as causes of traits in individuals but as causes of variation in traits between populations of individuals. Eventually, heritability came to refer to the amount of variance in a population sample that could be statistically attributed to genetic variation in that sample. Kinship (especially twin) studies provided seemingly straightforward ways of partitioning variation in population trait attributes into genetic versus environmental sources.

Into the early 21st century , hundreds of behavioral genetic studies of personality, intelligence, and psychopathology were reported. With rare exceptions, these studies converge to argue for a pervasive influence of genetics on human psychological variation.

These studies have also fueled much controversy. Citing in part behavioral genetic research, the educational psychologist Arthur Jensen ( 1969 ) claimed that the differences in intelligence and educational achievement in the United States between black and white students appeared to have a strong genetic basis. He went on to assume that because these racial differences appeared hereditary, they were likely impervious to environmental (educational) intervention. His article fanned the embers of past eugenics practices and ignited fiery responses (e.g., Hirsch, 1975 ). The ensuing debates not only spawned a rethinking of intelligence and how to measure it, but they ushered in a more critical look at the methods and assumptions of behavioral genetics.

Challenges to Behavioral Genetics

Many of the early critiques of behavioral genetics centered on interpreting the heritability statistic commonly calculated in kinship (family, twin, and adoption) studies. Perhaps more so than any other statistic, heritability has been persistently misinterpreted by academics and laypersons alike (Lerner, 2002 ). Contrary to popular belief, heritability tells us nothing about the relative impact of genetic and environmental factors on the development of traits in individuals. It deals with accounting for trait variation between people, not the causes of traits within people. As a result, a high heritability does not indicate anything about the fixity of traits or their imperviousness to environmental influence (contra Jensen), and a low heritability does not indicate an absence of genetic influence on trait development. Worse still, heritability does not even indicate anything about the role of genetics in generating the differences between people.

Other challenges to heritability focused not on its interpretation but on its underlying computational assumptions. Most notably, heritability analyses assume that genetic and environmental contributions to trait differences are independent and additive. The interaction between genetic and environmental factors were dismissed a priori in these analyses. Studies of development, however, show that no factor (genes, hormones, parenting, schooling) operates independently, making it impossible to quantify how much of a given trait in a person is due to any causal factor. Thus heritability analyses are bound to be misleading because they are based on biologically implausible and logically indefensible assumptions about development (Gottlieb, 2003 ).

Aside from heritability, kinship studies have been criticized for not being able to disentangle genetic and environmental effects on variation. It had long been known that that in family (pedigree) studies, environmental and genetic factors are confounded. Twin and adoption studies seemed to provide unique opportunities to statistically disentangle these effects, but these studies are also deeply problematic in assumptions and methodology. There are numerous plausible environmental reasons for why monozygotic twin pairs could resemble each other more than dizygotic twin pairs or why adoptive children might more closely resemble their biological than their adoptive parents (Joseph & Ratner, 2013 ).

A more recent challenge to behavioral genetics came from an unlikely source. Advances in genomic scanning in the 21st century made it possible in a single study to correlate thousands of genetic polymorphisms with variation in the psychological profiles (e.g., intelligence, memory, temperament, psychopathology) of thousands of people. These “genome-wide association” studies seemed to have the power and precision to finally identify genetic contributions to heritability at the level of single nucleotides. Yet, these studies consistently found only very small effects.

The failure to find large effects came to be known as the “missing heritability” problem (Maher, 2008 ). To account for the missing heritability, some behavioral geneticists and molecular biologists asserted that important genetic polymorphisms remain unknown, they may be too rare to detect, and/or that current studies are just not well equipped to handle gene–gene interactions. These studies were also insensitive to epigenetic profiles (see the section on Behavioral Epigenetics), which deal with differences in gene expression. Even when people share genes, they may differ in whether those genes get expressed in their lifetimes.

But genome-wide association studies faced an even more problematic issue: Many of these studies failed to replicate (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2015 ). For those who viewed heritability analyses as biologically implausible, the small effect sizes and failures to replicate in genome-wide association studies were not that surprising. The search for independent genetic effects was bound to fail, because genes simply do not operate independently during development.

Behavioral Epigenetics

Epigenetics was a term coined in the 1940s by the developmental biologist Conrad Waddington to refer to a new field of study that would examine how genetic factors interact with local environmental conditions to bring about the embryological development of traits. By the end of the 20th century , epigenetics came to refer to the study of how nongenetic, molecular mechanisms physically regulate gene expression patterns in cells and across cell lineages. The most-studied mechanisms involve organic compounds (e.g., methyl-groups) that physically bind to DNA or the surrounding proteins that package DNA. The addition or removal of these compounds can activate or silence gene transcription. Different cell types have different, stable epigenetic markings, and these markings are recreated during cell division so that cells so marked give rise to similar types of cells. Epigenetic changes were known to occur during developmental periods of cellular differentiation (e.g., during embryogenesis), but not until 2004 was it discovered that these changes can occur at other periods in the life, including after birth (Roth, 2013 )

Of interest to psychologists were reports that different behavioral and physiological profiles (e.g., stress reactivity) of animals were associated with different epigenetic patterns in the nervous system (Moore, 2015 ). Furthermore, these different epigenetic patterns could be established or modified by environmental factors (e.g., caregiving practices, training regimes, or environmental enrichment), and, under certain conditions, they remain stable over long periods of time (from infancy to adulthood).

Because epigenetic research investigates the physical interface between genes and environment, it represents an exciting advance in understanding the interaction of nature and nurture. Despite some warnings that the excitement over behavioral epigenetic research may be premature (e.g., Miller, 2010 ), for many psychologists, epigenetics underscores how development involves both nature and nurture.

For others, what is equally exciting is the additional evidence epigenetics provides to show that the genome is an interactive and regulated system. Once viewed as the static director of development buffered from environment influence, the genome is better described as a developing resource of the cell (Moore, 2015 ). More broadly, epigenetics also points to how development is not a genetically (or biologically) predetermined affair. Instead, epigenetics provides additional evidence that development is a probabilistic process, contingent upon factors internal and external to the organism. In this sense, epigenetics is well positioned to help dissolve the nature–nurture dichotomy.

Beyond Nature–Nurture

In the final decades of the 20th century , a position was articulated to move beyond the dichotomous nature–nurture framework. The middle-ground position on nature–nurture did not seem up to the task of explaining the origins of form, and it brought about more confusion than clarity. The back-and-forth (or balanced) pendulum between nature- and nurture-based positions throughout history had only gone in circles. Moving forward would require moving beyond such dichotomous thinking (Johnston, 1987 ).

The anti-dichotomy position, referred to as the Developmentalist tradition, was expressed in a variety of systems-based, metatheoretical approaches to studying development, all of which extended the arguments against nature–nurture expressed earlier by Kuo and Lehrman. The central problem with all nativist claims according to Developmentalists is a reliance on preformationism (or predeterminism).

The problem with preformationism, they argue, besides issues of evidence, is that it is an anti-developmental mindset. It presumes the existence of the very thing(s) one wishes to explain and, consequently, discourages developmental analyses. To claim that some knowledge is innate effectively shuts down research on the developmental origins of that knowledge. After all, why look for the origins of conceptual knowledge if that knowledge is there all along? Or why search for any experiential contributions to innate behaviors if those behaviors by definition develop independently of experience? In the words of Developmentalists Thelen and Adolph ( 1992 ), nativism “leads to a static science, with no principles for understanding change or for confronting the ultimate challenge of development, the source of new forms in structure and function” (p. 378).

A commitment to maturational theory is likely one of the reasons why studies of motor development remained relatively dormant for decades following its heyday in the 1930–1940s (Thelen, 2000 ). Likewise, a commitment to maturational theory also helps explain the delay in neuroscience to examine how the brain physically changes in response to environmental conditions, a line of inquiry that only began in the 1960s.

In addition to the theoretical pitfalls of nativism, Developmentalists point to numerous studies that show how some seemingly native behaviors and innate constraints on learning are driven by the experiences of animals. For example, the comparative psychologist Gilbert Gottlieb ( 1971 ) showed that newly hatched ducklings display a naïve preference for a duck maternal call over a (similarly novel) chicken maternal call (Gottlieb, 1971 ), even when duck embryos were repeatedly exposed to the chicken call prior to hatching (Gottlieb, 1991 ). It would be easy to conclude that ducklings have an innate preference to approach their own species call and that they are biologically constrained (contraprepared) in learning a chicken call. However, Gottlieb found that the naïve preference for the duck call stemmed from exposure to the duck embryos’ own (or other) vocalizations in the days before hatching (Gottlieb, 1971 ). Exposure to these vocalizations not only made duck maternal calls more attractive, but it hindered the establishment of a preference for heterospecific calls. When duck embryos were reared in the absence of the embryonic vocalizations (by devocalizing embryos in ovo ) and exposed instead to chicken maternal calls, the newly hatched ducklings preferred chicken over duck calls (Gottlieb, 1991 ). These studies clearly showed how seemingly innate, biologically based preferences and constraints on learning derived from prenatal sensory experiences.

For Developmentalists, findings like these suggest that nativist explanations of any given behavior are statements of ignorance about how that behavior actually develops. As Kuo and Lehrman made clear, nativist terms are labels, not explanations. Although such appeals are couched in respectable, scientific language (e.g., “X is due to maturation, genes, or heredity”), they argue it would be more accurate simply to say that “We don’t know what causes X” or that “X is not due to A, B, or C.” Indeed, for Developmentalists, the more we unpack the complex dynamics about how traits develop, the less likely we are to use labels like nature or nurture (Blumberg, 2005 ).

On the other hand, Developmentalists recognize that labeling a behavior as “learned” also falls short as an explanatory construct. The empiricist position that knowledge or behavior is learned does not adequately take into account that what is learned and how easily something is learned depends on (a) the physiological and developmental status of the person, (b) the nature of the surrounding physical and social context in which learning takes place, and the (c) experiential history of the person. The empiricist tendency to say “X is learned or acquired through experience” can also short-circuit developmental analyses in the same way as nativist claims.

Still, Developmentalists appreciate that classifying behaviors can be useful. For example, the development of some behaviors may be more robust, reliably emerging across a range of environments and/or remaining relatively resistant to change, whereas others are more context-specific and malleable. Some preferences for stimuli require direct experience with those stimuli. Other preferences require less obvious (indirect) types of experiences. Likewise, it can still be useful to describe some behaviors in the ways shown in Table 1 . Developmentalists simply urge psychologists to resist the temptation to treat these behavioral classifications as implying different kinds of explanations (Johnston, 1987 ).

Rather than treat nature and nurture as separate developmental sources of causation (see Figure 1 ), Developmentalists argue that a more productive way of thinking about nature–nurture is to reframe the division as that between product and process (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2015 ). The phenotype or structure (one’s genetic, epigenetic, anatomical, physiological, behavioral, and mental profile) of an individual at any given time can be considered one’s “nature.” “Nurture” then refers to the set of processes that generate, maintain, and transform one’s nature (Figure 2 ). These processes involve the dynamic interplay between phenotypes and environments.

Figure 2. The developmentalist alternative view of nature–nurture as product–process. Developmentalists view nature and nurture not as separate sources of causation in development (see Figure 1 ) but as a distinction between process (nurture) and product (nature).

It is hard to imagine any set of findings that will end debates about the roles of nature and nurture in human development. Why? First, more so than other assumptions about human development, the nature–nurture dichotomy is deeply entrenched in popular culture and the life sciences. Second, throughout history, the differing positions on nature and nurture were often driven by other ideological, philosophical, and sociopolitical commitments. Thus the essential source of tension in debates about nature–nurture is not as much about research agendas or evidence as about basic differences in metatheoretical positions (epistemological and ontological assumptions) about human behavior and development (Overton, 2006 ).

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Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour

• Mairi Levitt 1  

Life Sciences, Society and Policy volume  9 , Article number:  13 ( 2013 ) Cite this article

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Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. In practice the nature-nurture model persists as a way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviour in genetic research papers, as well as in the media and lay debate. Social and environmental theories of crime have been dominant in criminology and in public policy while biological theories have been seen as outdated and discredited. Recently, research into genetic variations associated with aggressive and antisocial behaviour has received more attention in the media. This paper explores ideas on the role of nature and nurture in violent and antisocial behaviour through interviews and open-ended questionnaires among lay publics. There was general agreement that everybody’s behaviour is influenced to varying degrees by both genetic and environmental factors but deterministic accounts of causation, except in exceptional circumstances, were rejected. Only an emphasis on nature was seen as dangerous in its consequences, for society and for individuals themselves. Whereas academic researchers approach the debate from their disciplinary perspectives which may or may not engage with practical and policy issues, the key issue for the public was what sort of explanations of behaviour will lead to the best outcomes for all concerned.

Trying to separate out nature and nurture as explanations for behaviour, as in classic genetic studies of twins and families, is now said to be both impossible and unproductive. The nature-nurture debate is declared to be officially redundant by social scientists and scientists, ‘outdated, naive and unhelpful’ (Craddock, 2011 , p.637), ‘a false dichotomy’ (Traynor 2010 , p.196). Geneticists argue that nature and nurture interact to affect behaviour through complex and not yet fully understood ways, but, in practice, the debate continues 1 . Research papers by psychologists and geneticists still use the terms nature and nurture, or genes and environment, to consider their relative influences on, for example, temperament and personality, childhood obesity and toddler sleep patterns (McCrae et al., 2000 ; Anderson et al., 2007 ; Brescianini, 2011 ). These papers separate out and quantify the relative influences of nature/genes and nurture/environment. These papers might be taken to indicate how individuals acquire their personality traits or toddlers acquire their sleep patterns; part is innate or there at birth and part is acquired after birth due to environmental influences. The findings actually refer to technical heritability which is, ‘the proportion of phenotypic variation attributable to genetic differences between individuals’ (Keller, 2010 , p.57). In practice, as Keller illustrates, there is ‘slippage’ between heritability, meaning a trait being biologically transmissible, and technical heritability. This is not simply a mistake made by the media or ‘media hype’ but is, she argues, ‘almost impossible to avoid’ (ibid, p.71).

While researchers are aware of the complexity of gene-environment interaction, the ‘nature and nurture’ model persists as a simple way of framing discussion on the causes of behaviours. It is also a site of struggle between (and within) academic disciplines and, through influence on policy, has consequences for those whose behaviours are investigated. There is general agreement between social scientists and geneticists about the past abuses of genetics but disagreement over whether it will be possible for the new behavioural genetics to avoid discrimination and eugenic practices, and about the likely benefits that society will gain from this research (Parens et al. 2006 , xxi). In a special issue of the American Journal of Sociology ‘Exploring genetics and social structure’, Bearman considers the reasons why sociologists are concerned about genetic effects on behaviour; first they see it as legitimating existing societal arrangements, which assumes that ‘genetic’ is unchangeable. Second, if sociologists draw on genetic research it contaminates the sociological enterprise and, third, whatever claims are made to the contrary, it is a eugenicist project (Bearman, 2008 , vi). As we will see all these concerns were expressed by the publics in this study. Policy makers and publics are interested in explaining problem behaviour in order to change/control it, not in respecting disciplinary boundaries, and will expect the role of genetics to be considered alongside social factors. 2

Social and environmental theories of criminal behaviour have been dominant in criminology, and in public policy (Walsh, 2009 , p.7). Genetic disorders and mental illness have provided explanations for a small minority of offenders with specific conditions. A 2007 survey of American criminologists found that ‘criminologists of all ideological persuasions view alleged biosocial causes of crime (hormonal, genetic, and evolutionary factors and possibly low intelligence) as relatively unimportant’ compared with environmental causes (Cooper et al., 2010 ). Sociology textbooks have typically discussed biological theories of criminality only as discredited (Haralambos and Holborn, 2004 , Giddens, 2009 ). Biosocial theories are seen as attractive to ‘agents of social control’ and to be more likely to lead to abusive treatment of offenders. However, with increasing research and public interest in genetics more attention has been paid to biological aspects of crime and to genetic variations within the normal range. Research has focussed on violent and antisocial behaviours which are criminal or may be seen as a precursor to criminal behaviour, for example, antisocial behaviour in young people. Media reports have headlined ‘warrior genes’, ‘the aggressive gene’ and the ‘get out of jail free gene’, all referring to levels of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) (Lea and Chambers, 2007 ; Levitt and Pieri, 2009 ) 3 . Think tanks and ethics groups have considered the ethics and practicalities of genetic testing for behavioural traits (Campbell and Ross, 2004 ; Dixon, 2005 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2002 ).

An attraction of research into genes and behaviour is the hope that identifying a genetic factor that is correlated with an increased incidence of, say, violent and antisocial behaviour, will point to a way of reducing such behaviour. Fotaki discusses the attraction of biological explanations of inequalities in health based on the assumption that genetic interventions ‘would succeed in addressing the causes of ill health that public health policies cannot.’ (Fotaki, 2011 , p.641). The danger is that biological explanations ‘are once more employed for political purposes to explain away the social roots of health inequalities.’ (ibid). Social scientists, and criminologists, have presented biological/genetic explanations of behaviour as dangerous in terms of their potential effect on the individuals or groups identified as genetically at risk. There are obvious dangers of discrimination against, and the stigmatisation of, already vulnerable groups who would be the first to be tested i.e. ‘problem’ families or minority ethnic groups. Discrimination could affect education, employment and family life. The effect of an individual being told s/he has a risk based on a genetic test has been much discussed in relation to health risks (Claassen et al., 2010 . While such information could be motivating, because it is personalised, it can also induce a fatalistic attitude that discourages the person from taking preventative measures. Claasen et al. conclude that it is important to identify those vulnerable to the fatalistic impact and to tailor health risk information (ibid p.194). Identifying risk for behaviour, rather than for disease, is likely to be more problematic because of the difficulty of finding preventative measures that are within the individuals’ own control.

..using DNA to assess risk, make a diagnosis or tailor treatments, may weaken beliefs in the efficacy of preventive behaviour and reinforce biological ways of reducing risk, resulting in a preference for medication as opposed to behavioural means to control or reduce risk (ibid, xiv).

Claasen et al.’s comment on genetic tests for health conditions could apply equally to parents given a behavioural risk for their young child from a genetic test, perhaps before any problem behaviour was evident. The test result could weaken parents’ belief that they could take action to prevent/reduce the risk of the behaviour developing in their child and pharmaceutical solutions, as posited by Caspi et al. might not be available (Caspi et al., 2002 , xvii). However, it is not necessarily the case that evidence of genetic or biological influence on behaviour leads to more punitive treatment. DeLisi et al. give the example of the use of findings from adolescent brain science in the case of Roper v. Simmons in the US which abolished the death penalty for adolescents. On the basis of the research it was stated that young people under the age of 18 ‘are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures including peer pressure’ (DeLisa et al., 2010 , p.25) When evidence on genetic traits associated with criminal behaviour has been allowed by courts, mainly in the US, it has so far more often been accepted as a mitigating rather than an aggravating factor in the offenders’ behaviour (Denno, 2009 , Farahany and Coleman, 2006 ).

Environmental explanations of behaviour can, of course, also be presented as deterministic, claiming a closed future for those experiencing poverty and disadvantage. However, it is biological explanations that have caused more concern not only because of the history of eugenics but also because they may be seen as more fundamental, being there from birth, and as harder to change. The public in surveys are reported to see the greatest role for genetic factors in physical features, a lesser role in health conditions and a smaller role still in human behaviour (Condit, 2010 , p.619).

Public perceptions

The model of nature/genes and nurture/environment is still used in behavioural genetics, as well as in popular culture, and has implications for public policy, including the treatment of offenders who claim that a genetic trait has influenced their criminal behaviour. The aim of this research was to explore ideas on the causes of behaviour, particularly violent and antisocial behaviour and examine how respondents use the nature/nurture model. This qualitative research looks at the ways in which lay publics in different age groups conceptualise the factors and influences that made them who they are and their explanations for the behaviour of other people; especially violent behaviour. It was hypothesised that the increased research and media emphasis on the role of genetic factors in health and behaviour might result in an increasing interest in ‘nature’, biology and genes as explanations for behaviour particularly among the young, but, when explaining their own behaviour people might prefer to see themselves as agents with control over their lives. By exploring explanations of behaviour with respondents from different generations, age differences should be apparent.

The views of 78 respondents from 3 generations were gathered by individual interview and questionnaires, using the same open ended questions and responses to two real-life criminal court case studies where environmental or genetic factors had been used by the defence team. Respondents were drawn from a group of retired people participating in an informal ‘senior learners’ programme at Lancaster University, a group of their mainly younger relatives and, in order to recruit more third generation respondents, a group of first year students taking a criminology module. The senior learners group had a programme of talks and discussions and could attend undergraduate lectures. They had, by definition, shown an interest in current issues in a range of fields. There were no educational or age requirements for the group but all the volunteers were retired from paid work and were aged from around 65 years to over 80 years.. They had had similar careers to those popular with social science students; social work, probation, teaching and administrative positions. The senior learners were asked to pass on questionnaires to younger relatives to investigate age differences in attitudes. The first 13 senior learners who responded were interviewed but as only 15 questionnaires were received from their relatives ethical approval was obtained to distribute the same questionnaire to Lancaster University students taking the criminology first year module. Most students were enrolled on social science degrees, including psychology and sociology, and age 18 or 19. While the sample of senior learners and relatives had only a few more women than men, 78 per cent of the students were female reflecting the gender balance on the module as a whole. This makes it difficult to comment on any gender differences in responses. No claims to generalisability are made for this exploratory study. Responses were coded and entered on SPSS and also analysed thematically using Atlas-ti.

The introduction to the interviews and questionnaire was ‘I am interested in your views and ideas on what makes us the people we are; what makes people behave the way they do? What is the influence of nature and nurture?’ The terms, nature and nurture were not used again until the final question. Although the terms were not defined all respondents readily used them with consistent meanings. They identified ‘nature’ with biology, ‘what you are born with’ and genes or DNA and nurture with all aspects of the environment including parenting, socio-economic conditions, the food you eat, culture and other people. Their understanding of environment was therefore similar to that used by genetic researchers; environment as everything that is external to the individual, although they tended to refer more to the social than the biological environment.

A general warm-up question asked whether, in their own family, there was anything they thought of as a ‘family trait’. Then respondents were asked; ‘Imagine a baby swapped at birth and brought up in a completely different family– which influences do you think would be most important – the influence of the birth parents or the influences of the new family- and why?’ 4 The rest of the interview schedule, and the subsequent questionnaire, consisted of open-ended questions.

Respondents were asked how they would explain different kinds of behaviour if they came across a child who is kind and considerate; a young person who displays antisocial and aggressive behaviour adult and an adult with criminal convictions for violence. This was to tap into any differences in general explanations of good and bad behaviour in young people and adults. A quotation about the child killers in the Bulger case being ‘unreformable’ was used to ascertain whether they saw some types of violent behavior, and the actors concerned, as immutable. In order to see how respondents conceptualized the influences of nature/biology/genes and environment/people/experiences in their own lives, respondents were asked to write down ‘what or who made you what you are today’ and any explanation of their responses. Comments were gathered on the introduction of an environmental factor (childhood neglect) by the defence in a violent attack by two young boys in England, and on a genetic factor (MAOA levels) introduced by the defence in an criminal court in Italy. Respondents were asked how they thought such evidence should be dealt with; whether it should affect the degree of blame and whether it should affect criminal responsibility. The final question asked if it mattered ‘for individuals or society’ whether nature or nurture was seen as most important in explaining problem behaviour. Those interviewed were asked if they had any further comments and there was a space for any additional comments on the questionnaire.

This paper focuses on the ways in which respondents employed nature/genes and nurture/environment in their responses as a whole and what other concepts they drew on when explaining behaviour.

Respondents’ explanations of what makes people behave the way they do are discussed through three themes.

Nurture is more influential than nature

Nature and nurture interact

Emphasising nature (but never nurture) can be dangerous

Theme 1: Nurture is more influential than nature

Whether asked about influences on a baby adopted at birth, on their own lives, on an aggressive child or a violent young person, almost all respondents emphasised nurture. Parents and family were seen as the most important influences for babies and young children, moving to peer group and other relationships and experiences for a young person. The explanation for the violent behaviour of an adult had more to do with the individual and the importance of nurture/environment in explaining behaviour weakened. The quotations below explaining behaviour in a child adopted at birth, a young person and an adult illustrate the widening of influences from infancy through childhood and the onus on adults to take responsibility for themselves.

[a child] The environment in which a child grows up in, particularly the influence and role of the parents shapes how a child will grow up and what sort of adult they will be (77 Student).

[a young person] I believe that upbringing shapes a person’s personality. Provisions of education, lifestyle opportunities and friendship groups all determine ….outlook. You can see evidence in young people at the school I teach at (20 Relative).

Once adult they have to take responsibility for themselves and address whatever has been in their background. An adult can’t turn round and say it’s not my fault (5 Senior Learner).

Participants also saw themselves as shaped by the people surrounding them, starting with their parents, or those who brought them up. Several mentioned the illness and/or death of a parent during their childhood and older respondents talked about separation due to the second world war. Students were especially likely to mention the influence of morals instilled in them by their parents, the core values and discipline that they were taught at home. Educational experiences were important to all. For the senior learners the school leaving age had been age 15, so whether or not they stayed on at school and took public examinations was crucial for their future, and, this decision depended largely on their parents and environment. For the student respondents who had come to university from school, life so far has been ‘kind of set-out’ (41 Student), in the sense that they had progressed through the education system to gain qualifications for university. For their peer group it was normal still to be in education or training at the age of 18.

The lasting effects of early influences were particularly striking among the senior learners, because they were much further removed in years from their childhood. Many related stories about parental influence and also about teachers who taught them at least 50 years ago and had affected them for better or worse. For example a senior learner recalled one of her teachers;

I hated primary school – the teacher in 3rd or 4th year juniors [for ages 9–11] I hated her she was not a nice woman….. I passed to go to the grammar school and it shocked her. She made a derogatory comment – may not have been directed at me but felt it was- about some who should have passed and didn’t and some passing who should not have done…… I always vowed I would never be like that when I was teaching….(11 Senior Learner).

Those who related negative influences presented themselves as active in response, not necessarily at the time but later in their lives. For example a student whose mother had died wrote that ‘it made me more independent’ and another student who was bullied at school wrote that ‘it made me stronger’. The adult had to deal with all the influences (negative or positive) and take control.

Theme 2: Nature and nurture interact

While respondents’ view of themselves and of a child adopted at birth assigned greater influence to environment this did not mean that they held a simplistic model of, for example 60:40 nurture to nature. In this one question when they were asked to choose one or other as the major influence, almost all chose nurture, as many social scientists might do. However, in open questions and comments more complex interactive models were expressed. Environment/nurture can affect genes/nature and vice versa. No one used the term epigenetics but responses referred to the possibility of environmental influences affecting gene expression, for example;

People with certain predispositions (e.g. to violence) are affected by society, and society affects how their genes are expressed (40 Student).

An older respondent reflects on personal experience of child rearing and asks whether nurture is influenced by nature;

I think the nature nurture debate is very interesting. In my family I can see where my children have their own natures that have developed despite being brought up in the same family with the same boundaries etc. However, as a parent did I alter how I nurture them to take into account their nature? (14 Senior Learner).

This quotation illustrates the inseparability of nature and nurture. The child is developing within the family and the parent is developing parenting strategies informed by previous experiences and by other influences including the reactions of the children.

It was obvious to respondents that both genetic and environmental factors impact on everyone (although the role of genes is not yet understood) and it will be harder for some than for others to behave well because of their genes and environment. These people may need different treatment or extra help if they have committed violent and aggressive crimes but that does not excuse their behaviour. Only in exceptional cases, like insanity, can a young person or adult be said to have no choice but to act in a particular way. It is important that people are seen as responsible while also giving them the help they need. In these two comments the treatment for environmental problems and ‘biology’ are similar; the individual can be helped to modify his/her behaviour.

No, [nature and nurture] both play a part, but they can’t be the explanation for everything. Some people grow up in broken homes and get treated appallingly- yet they seem to understand right + wrong and accept responsibility for their actions. There are too many excuses and we never solve any problems, just make them harder to resolve.......I think if you are sane and you know right from wrong you need to suffer the consequences if you’ve committed a crime, but I do appreciate you may need help psychologically if you have anger issues, for example. If we constantly find reasons to diminish blame from people who have committed heinous acts of crime more people will think they can get away with it and it will cause more harm than good (78 Student).

Some say you can’t fight your biology, but there are social factors that can stop bad behaviour like learned restraint (72 Student).

The desire to leave a space for individual agency may be linked to the finding that emphasising nature, but never nurture, could be dangerous. It is clear that as children grow up they can exercise more control over their environment, although some have more control and choices than others. On the other hand, whatever the individual is born with (genes and nature) is, or seems to be, less malleable which could lead to different criminal justice policies and different social perceptions of the criminal.

Theme 3: Emphasising nature (but never nurture) can be dangerous for society as a whole as well as for the criminal and victims

The question asked was whether it mattered ‘for individuals or society’ if either nature or nurture was seen as most important in explaining problem behavior. The two most popular answers were that both nature and nurture were needed to explain behaviour, or, that nurture was more important and that there were dangers in emphasising nature. No one in the sample regarded an emphasis on nurture as dangerous or detrimental to the individual or society. On the contrary, emphasising nurture was thought more likely to lead to non-punitive treatment of offenders. There would be attempts to alter future behaviour through improved education and parenting and spreading of knowledge in society about the impact nurture has on young people. Society as a whole would share the blame rather than the individual. As a student put it; ‘society as a whole [would be] open for criticism’ (55 S). An emphasis on nurture was therefore seen as more likely to lead to understanding of problem behaviours and effective treatment, however, the individuals were still to be held responsible for their behaviour.

In contrast there was a mistrust of nature/genetic explanations that again centred on the practical consequences for individuals. It would affect the way criminals were treated by others but could also change their view of themselves. Behaviour would be seen as unchangeable, out of the control of the individual or social action. As a consequence, individual accountability might be removed. The idea that individuals must normally be held responsible for their actions was constantly emphasised (Levitt, 2013 ).

It does [matter] because [if nurture is emphasised] people will care, parent and look after and raise people with more care. However if it’s proven it is nature, then people may lose the will to live (60 Student).

Several SLs referred to the examination at the end of primary education (the ‘eleven plus’) when explaining why they emphasised environment/nurture rather than nature, or, in this case, innate intelligence. The ‘eleven plus’ examination was used to decide which children would be offered a place at an academically selective grammar school and was based on the idea that intelligence, and future academic achievement, could be accurately measured and predicted at the age of 10 or 11.

‘The 11+ was a nature thing. I did the 11+ − it had an effect. Saying children not going to improve or change. Very embedded in the whole idea of nature – it can’t really be true’ (8 Senior Learner).

An emphasis on nature has practical detrimental consequences for individuals. Their status is fixed, for example as ‘not academic’ or ‘born evil’ and suggests, to them and to others, that their ‘nature’ is unchangeable or very difficult to change by individual or social action.

Yes, [it matters] hugely as position of blame is dependent on whether a person chose to do what they did .....nature suggests no control (35 Student).

Those who thought an emphasis on nature meant people were irredeemable either gave that as a reason not to emphasise nature or to suggest that in fact ‘defects’ of nature could be overcome, as in this comment by a student emphasising the power of education;

Yes it is very important because it helps to understand if people are reformable (nurture) or irredeemable (nature). I believe we are determined by our education and thus with the proper help we can change. In the case of people with major biological defects, education is still a way to get over these obstacles and society should be ready to help these people (38 Student).

It might be thought that offenders themselves would embrace a genetic explanation of their behaviour if this was interpreted, as the respondents feared, as meaning they were not responsible for their crimes. However, a small study of juvenile offenders in the Netherlands found that they gave social explanations of their crimes and most rejected the idea that biology might be a factor. They committed a crime for a specific purpose like to get money or to impress others or they gave environmental reasons such as a deprived background or peer pressure or explained their offences were due to psychological conditions brought on by the use of alcohol and soft drugs (Horstkötter et al., 2012 , p.291). Whether they gave goal directed or environmental reasons ‘most of them also state that they had a choice and that it was their choice to commit the crime’ (ibid p.292). As one young offender said in interview;

In the end the person makes the choice himself… The choices I have made also had a share in my past. But in the end I am the one who has made these choices (ibid).

• Genes and environment

Respondents were at ease with the language of nature and nurture which was only used in the introduction to the questionnaire or interview. They readily equated genes with nature and nurture with all sorts of environmental influences. There was an acknowledgement that our understanding of environmental factors is greater than our understanding of genetics but that that would change. Older respondents were more likely to be concerned about such a change.

They're going to be doing a lot more with genetics. Influences policy profoundly and people have to be very careful. It worries me that seen to be [more determining]. The complexities don’t get looked at. If you emphasise environment it is safer from a policy point of view because given that most people don’t know what they are talking about it is safer to see the person as redeemable than to come down on the side of genetics and write people off (3 Senior Learner).

This quotation is typical in its view that nature/genes are seen as determining even though the influences on behaviour are, in reality, complex. Like the studies quoted at the beginning of the article respondents often acknowledged the complexities as nature and nurture interact but separated them when explaining the causes of specific behaviours. Students were less likely to be fearful of genetic explanations of behaviour despite their academic interest in social science. However, the hypothesis that young people might be more likely to be interested in genetic explanations for behaviour was not shown in this small study. The senior learners were more likely to refer to reading on genes and display knowledge of genetics. Older respondents and their relatives more often echoed the sociologists’ concerns about behavioural genetics discussed by Bearman earlier (Bearman, 2008 ). For those who feared the practical consequences of genetic explanations, like the respondent quoted above, ‘it is safer’ to keep away from them.

Some respondents in all age groups were prepared for advances in genetics to change their understanding of behaviour and prepared for current views of genes/nature as more basic, fixed and unchanging to change too. One of the youngest relatives, in her 20s, emphasised our incomplete knowledge of genetic influences on behaviour as a reason for focussing on nurture ‘at present’;

It is very tricky as we cannot see genes and I am not sure that I totally trust the idea of blaming genes for violent behaviour- maybe the person has a gene for passive behaviour as well. …….In any case we can change nurture but at present we cannot change nature so let’s do one thing at a time (20 Relative).

As respondents in this small study grappled with explanations for their own and others’ behaviour they focussed on the practical consequences leading to a greater concern over explanations based on nature than the more familiar ones based on a complex web of environmental factors. Whereas academic researchers approach the debate from their disciplinary perspectives which may or may not engage with practical and policy issues, the key issue for the public was what sort of explanations of behaviour will lead to the best outcomes for all concerned.

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Acknowledgement

The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is gratefully acknowledged. This work was part of the Research Programme of the ESRC Genomics Network at Cesagen (ESRC Centre for Economic and Social Aspects of Genomics).

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Levitt, M. Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour. Life Sci Soc Policy 9 , 13 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1186/2195-7819-9-13

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Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Neuroscience and Nervous System Disorders. From Molecules to Minds: Challenges for the 21st Century: Workshop Summary. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2008.

From Molecules to Minds: Challenges for the 21st Century: Workshop Summary.

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Grand Challenge: Nature Versus Nurture: How Does the Interplay of Biology and Experience Shape Our Brains and Make Us Who We Are?

Nature vs. nurture is one of the oldest questions in science. The answer is not an either/or, but rather it is both nature and nurture, acting in various degrees.

As summarized below in greater detail, many workshop participants—including Hyman, Marder, and Michael Greenberg, chair of the Department of Neurobiology at Harvard Medical School—chose to highlight the nature versus nurture question as one of the Grand Challenges of the field, but in so doing, they put a twist on the question, asking: How does the interplay of biology and experience shape our brains and make us who we are?

The key word there is “interplay.” “Interplay” suggests, and modern research in neuroscience demands, that there is a back and forth pattern between nature and nurture, a dynamic system that involves a continuous feedback loop shaping the physical structure of our brains.

• Brain Plasticity

Thirty years ago, the working assumption in neuroscience was this: People are born with a set number of neurons, hardwired in a certain way, and brain function is essentially all downhill from there. We spend our lifetimes losing connections and neurons—the brain slowly falling apart until we die.

Except it is not true. In 1998, Fred “Rusty” Gage, working out of the Laboratory of Genetics at the Salk Institute, showed that the human brain can and does produce new nerve cells into adulthood ( Eriksson et al., 1998 ). In mice, he showed that exercise could increase the rate of neurogenesis, showing that the system is not fixed, but responds itself to experience and the outside world. The discovery of neurogenesis and an improved understanding of neuroplasticity—the ability of the brain to shape, form, eliminate, and strengthen new connections throughout life—has completely recast the question of nature versus nurture.

“Neurons can change their connectivity,” explained Blakemore. “They can change the strength of their connections. They can change the morphology of their connections. They can do it not necessarily just in early stages of life, although that is especially exaggerated, but probably throughout life responding to new environments and experiences.”

New research shows, for instance, that the number and strength of connections we have in the brain is determined by how often those connections are stimulated. The brain, if you will, has a “use it or lose it” approach to neurological maintenance.

Genetic programming also plays a key role. In most cases, the initial formation of a synapse occurs independent of stimulation. But if that synapse is not used, the brain will “prune” or eliminate it. Conversely, the more often a connection is used, the stronger it becomes in a physical sense, with more dendritic spines connecting to one another and a stronger net connection over time.

On the developmental side, researchers now understand the critical role that sensory input plays in shaping the wiring of the brain from the earliest days. Blakemore discussed work in his lab on the development of neural wiring in mice. Researchers have known since the 1960s that the neurons connected to the ultrasensitive whiskers of mice align themselves in a format called “barrel fields.” Each of these barrel fields is connected to a single whisker, although how or why they influence function is unknown. Blakemore showed that if you removed a clump of whiskers at an early age, the segment of the brain linked to that area never develops the barrel structure.

Similar research has shown in mice that if you tape one eye shut from birth, the mouse never gains the ability to see from that eye—it needs the stimulation to develop. However, if you tape shut the eye of an adult mouse for a similar period of time, vision is not affected.

All this seems to point the finger toward experience, but of course, the system really works as a complete feedback loop.

“We used to think . . . that the capacity of the brain to change its connections was an entirely independent process from the genetic regulation of structure,” said Blakemore. “But, of course, that cannot be the case. If adaptive change is possible, that must be the consequence of having molecular mechanisms that mediate those changes. Plasticity is a characteristic that has been selected for, so there must be genes for plasticity.”

In the case of barrel fields, Blakemore’s lab and other investigators have identified a number of molecules and genes that appear to be involved in mediating between incoming information for the whiskers and the anatomical changes necessary to produce the barrel field.

Understanding how this interplay works has huge implications for understanding how our brain develops and changes over time, and raises a number of interesting questions. Marder, for instance, asked how the brain can be so plastic and yet still retain memories over time.

Plasticity, however, is just one half of the equation; the underlying genetics are critically important, and new techniques and technologies make this a particularly interesting time to address these questions. For instance, modern, high-throughput gene-profiling technologies allow researchers to figure out all of the underlying transcriptions in a neuron, and see how these are manifest in the body.

Understanding the interplay of biology and experience on learning and development will surely require understanding the biological processes that cause changes in individual neurons and synapses. But this is only part of the puzzle. We must also understand the control of learning processes at a system-wide level in the brain. How does the brain orchestrate the right set of neural synaptic updates based on training experiences we encounter over our lifetime? Given the tremendous number of synapses in the brain, it is unlikely that a purely bottom-up approach will suffice to answer this question.

A complementary approach to studying experience-based learning at a system level relies on machine learning algorithms that have been developed to allow robots to learn from experience, described Mitchell. One intriguing study has shown that temporal-difference learning algorithms, which enable robots successfully to learn control strategies such as how to fly helicopters autonomously, can be used to predict the neural activity of dopamine-based systems in the human brain that are involved in reward-based learning ( Schultz et al., 1997 ; Seymour et al., 2004 ; Doya, 2008 ). The integration of such system-level computational models alongside new research into synaptic plasticity offers an opportunity to examine the interplay of biology and experience on learning and development from multiple perspectives.

New tools will allow researchers to understand how variability between different genes and neurons and neuronal activity could influence behavior and capabilities across different people, the researchers said. Who we are is not only influenced by the yes/no expression of genes, but also the specific levels of expression among different genes, which in turn influences neuronal activity.

• Gene-Environment Interactions

Nature and nurture are not simply additive interactions that result in a particular behavior, but rather a complex interplay of many factors. Nature includes not only the usual factors—parents, homes, what people learn—but also many other factors that individuals are exposed to routinely in their daily environments. As Marder emphasized, we cannot simply assume that gene X produces behavior Y. Instead as Bialek described, there are often many additional factors that directly and indirectly interact with gene X and ultimately influence variants in behavior. These variants define individuality.

As previously described, it has been known for almost 50 years that experience from the outside environment shapes our brain. This comes initially from the original work of Nobel Laureates David Hubel and Torsten Wiesel who studied how information is sensed and processed in the part of the brain responsible for vision. As Greenberg commented, the field is now at a point where we could in the next 10 years attain a significant mechanistic understanding of how the environment impinges directly on our genes to give rise to a malleable organ that allows us to adapt and change.

• Huge Clinical Importance

Multiple participants at the workshop—including Nora Volkow, director of the National Institute on Drug Abuse; Joseph Takahashi, investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and Northwestern University; Lichtman; and Coyle—highlighted the role of genetics in shaping the brain as one of the fundamental challenges for neuroscience, both for its basic scientific interest and for its practical applications: Understanding how genes and experience come together to impact the brain could significantly alter how we think about treating neurological disease. Many of the most common neurological and mental health disorders—schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism, Parkinson’s disease, multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s disease—are complex genetic disorders that are influenced by environmental factors.

Alcino Silva, professor in the Departments of Neurobiology, Psychiatry and Psychology at the University of California, Los Angeles, showcased research from his lab showing he could treat and reverse developmental disorders in adult mice. This finding is worth repeating because it is so contrary to our general thinking on developmental disorders: Scientists working out of Silva’s lab have been able to reverse the impacts of the developmental disorder NF-1 (Neurofibromatosis type 1), which is caused by genetic malfunction, by treating the pathology of the disease in adult mice. These mice, which have obvious cognitive deficits, regain mental function when treated; Silva has advanced the study into human clinical trials.

The applications of this vein of study extend beyond developmental disorders. A growing body of evidence is revealing a massive feedback loop among genetics, neurological structure, experience, and disease. You are three times more likely to die from a heart attack if you are depressed than if you are not, for instance, and depression has a huge impact on diabetes as well, stated Coyle.

Taking a step backward, clinical data also show that people who experience multiple stressful episodes in their lives tend to suffer from clinical depression. But there is tremendous variation: Some people are resistant to stress and others are not.

“It turns out that the pattern is correlated with a polymorphic variation in one particular gene, the gene for the transporter for serotonin, a transmitter which is known to be involved in regulating mood,” explained Blakemore.

How do genes work in the brain to determine our resilience to stress, and how can those capabilities be monitored and modulated for better health?

• The Way Forward

Asking these kinds of questions was not realistic 10 or even 5 years ago. The advent of high-throughput gene profiling and the growing sophistication of our ability to manipulate genes in animal models lets us, for the first time, explore the role that genes play in both creating and modulating our neural structures. At the same time, new imaging techniques and technologies like channel rhodopsin “light switches” let us better characterize neural systems and their response to the world around us, and to begin to plumb the tremendous feedback loop among genes, experience, and the physical activity in the brain.

Until quite recently, these have remained philosophical questions, commented Marder. However, the field of neuroscience is now in a position—through all the molecular, connectomics, and technological advances—to put these questions on firm mechanistic, biological bases, and to attack them scientifically.

• Cite this Page Institute of Medicine (US) Forum on Neuroscience and Nervous System Disorders. From Molecules to Minds: Challenges for the 21st Century: Workshop Summary. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2008. Grand Challenge: Nature Versus Nurture: How Does the Interplay of Biology and Experience Shape Our Brains and Make Us Who We Are?
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Nature, nurture, and mental health Part 1: The influence of genetics, psychology, and biology

Debbie l stoewen.

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For some people, mental health may just be a passing thought, whereas for others it can be a daily challenge. Ever wonder why we are all so different, why some of us seem to coast through life while others struggle? Whether coasting or struggling, the more you are aware of “who you are in your world,” the more empowered — and hopefully even emboldened — you will be to optimize your mental health and live the life to which you aspire.

When we think of mental health, we tend to think of mental illness, problems, and disorders — the pathological side of it — but mental health also refers to states of mental wellness, emotional resilience, and psychosocial well-being; the side of the continuum we aim to strive towards. Mental disorders are often caused by a combination of, and interaction between, genetic, psychological, biological, and environmental factors ( 1 ). The first 3 refer to the personal factors that influence mental health — the nature part. The latter refers to the contextual factors — the nurture part.

This is the first of a 3-part series delving into the influence of nature and nurture on mental health. This article focuses on many of the nature- or person-related aspects; meaning the genetic, psychological, and biological factors that can influence mental health. The next article will focus on a range of nurture- or environment-related aspects, meaning the exposures and experiences from conception onwards that can influence mental health. The final article will offer a range of strategies to improve mental health, including those aimed to counter the nature and nurture aspects that increase the risk of mental illness. Ultimately, it is through awareness, acceptance, and then action — taking the right steps — that each of us can optimize our mental health.

Mental illness: A brief overview

Nearly 1 in 5 people live with a mental illness or will experience a mental illness in any given year ( 2 ). It affects people of all ages, education, income levels, and cultures ( 2 ). The prevalence is higher in women (22.3%) than men (15.1%), and by age 40, about 50% will have, or have had, a mental illness ( 2 ). Those in the veterinary profession appear to have an increased susceptibility to mental illness ( 3 ). Several studies cite that veterinarians have higher rates of serious psychological distress, depression, and suicidal ideation than those in the general public ( 3 – 5 ). The concern about veterinary mental health, related to work-related stress, compassion fatigue, and burnout, has steadily grown in recent years.

Although mental illness and mental disorder can be used interchangeably, mental illness, as a term, is more general because mental disorder is defined by a unique set of symptoms and causes. There are 3 common classes of mental disorders:

anxiety disorders [which include generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), specific phobia, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and separation anxiety disorder];

depressive disorders [which include major depressive disorder (MDD), bipolar I–II disorders, and dysthymic disorder]; and

substance abuse disorders (which include alcohol abuse, alcohol dependence, drug abuse, and drug dependence) ( 6 ).

Anxiety disorders are the most prevalent, followed by depressive disorders and substance abuse disorders, respectively. Of those people having a disorder, 55% have a single diagnosis, 22% have 2 diagnoses, and 23% have 3 or more, meaning that about 45% of people with disorders struggle with comorbidity ( 6 ).

Since mental disorders are often caused by a combination of, and interaction between, various factors, it is helpful to understand these factors and how they may influence mental health. This article focuses on the genetic, psychological, and biological factors — the nature side of things, noting that nature and nurture (the person and environment) are rarely separable, but rather, mutually dependent.

Hereditary predisposition to mental disorders

Most mental disorders are due to some combination of inheritance and exposure, meaning genes and environment ( 7 ). Although no simple genetic cause has been determined ( 7 ), certain genes and gene variations are associated with certain mental disorders ( 2 ). Disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression tend to run in families, posing an increased risk if a person has a relative with a diagnosis ( 7 ). Even for those who don’t inherit risk genes, genes can change after birth and contribute to mental illness through a process called de novo genetic change ( 7 ). In other words, how a person interacts with their environment, and their life choices, can influence their risk for mental illness.

Neurodiversity

There are several neurodevelopmental conditions that can influence mental health. These include attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), autism spectrum disorder, dyslexia, dyscalculia, dyspraxia, developmental language disorder and tic disorders ( 8 ). Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and autism spectrum disorder (traditionally understood as separate conditions) are now increasingly diagnosed together due to a better understanding of the common underlying genetics. Highly genetic, ADHD is a brain-based syndrome that has to do with the regulation of a particular set of brain functions and related behaviors ( 8 ). Some people have never been diagnosed, despite the presence of neurodiverse traits. Those with ADHD are 3 times more prone to depression and are at increased risk of an anxiety disorder and substance abuse.

Sensitivity

Sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) is a personality trait regarded as “an increased sensitivity of the central nervous system and a deeper cognitive processing of physical, social and emotional stimuli” ( 9 ). Sensory processing sensitivity is moderately inheritable, with 47% attributable to genetic factors ( 10 ). It is characterized by low sensory threshold (i.e., sensitivity to subtle external stimuli), ease of excitation (i.e., being easily over-whelmed by internal and external stimuli), and aesthetic sensitivity (i.e., openness for, and pleasure of, aesthetic experiences and positive stimuli) ( 9 ). Roughly 20% of the population is thought to be highly sensitive ( 9 ).

Highly sensitive people tend to be empathetic, artistically creative, intuitive, and highly aware of the needs of others, but they can easily become overwhelmed, exhausted, and burned out, especially with sensing (i.e., “absorbing”) the emotional cues of those around them. Loud, crowded, or visually busy spaces can overwhelm sensitive people. Sensory processing sensitivity is associated with higher levels of stress, physical symptoms of ill-health, poor stress management, greater work displeasure (and need for recovery), anxiety, depression, alexithymia, and traits of autism spectrum disorders ( 9 , 10 ).

High IQ and giftedness

Gifted people have traits that set them apart from their average peers, such as complex intellectual ability, divergent thinking, high creativity, excitability, sensitivity, introversion, perceptivity, strong moral convictions, concern for justice, need for truth, and entelechy (i.e., having a goal) ( 11 ). Thus, many who are gifted lead their lives feeling different (nearly aberrant) from others, feel they must hide who they really are to be accepted, and engage in social coping strategies to avoid standing out, all of which, as stressors, can place them at risk for mental disorders ( 12 ). Research, however, has identified little difference in the incidence of mental disorders between the gifted and non-gifted, apart from creatively gifted people ( 12 ). Creatively gifted people are at an increased risk for depression and suicide.

Perfectionism

Perfectionism is a personality style characterized by excessively high personal standards and overly critical self-evaluations. It can be self-oriented (expecting perfection of oneself), other-oriented (expecting perfection in others), and socially prescribed (expecting perfection of oneself in response to perceived expectations of society) ( 13 ). Although high achievers are driven by intrinsic motivation or a passion for what they’re doing, perfectionists are driven by anxiety — by a fear of failure and the sense of never being good enough, of somehow being flawed. Perfectionists thus suffer rather than take joy in the pursuit of excellence ( 12 ).

Perfectionism can severely impact mental health. It can not only rob someone of peace of mind and enjoyment of life, but it’s also linked to feelings of failure, guilt, indecisiveness, procrastination, shame, and low self-esteem; workaholism; and many mental disorders, including anxiety disorders, depression, bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, personality disorders, eating disorders, body dysmorphic disorder, substance abuse, self-harm, and even suicide ( 13 , 14 ). Perfectionism is estimated to be 25 to 40% hereditary.

Self-esteem

Self-esteem is a person’s subjective evaluation of their own worth. It’s related to the ability to hold a favorable attitude towards the self, and to retain it in situations that are challenging, especially those that include being evaluated by others ( 15 ). It is moderately inheritable, with approximately 50% attributable to genetic factors. Self-esteem is an important part of psychological health. The beliefs people hold about themselves determine who they are, what they can do, and what they can become ( 16 ).

Those with high self-esteem are more likely to have higher well-being and quality of life, better social relations, greater job satisfaction, and more success in life than their counterparts ( 15 , 16 ). Those with low self-esteem are at risk of an array of social problems (notably poor relationships) and mental disorders, including anxiety disorders, depression, dysthymia, substance abuse, eating disorders, violence, high-risk behaviors, and suicide ( 15 , 16 ). Unfortunately, just as low self-esteem increases the susceptibility for a mental disorder, the presence of a mental disorder, in turn, lowers self-esteem, creating a vicious downward spiral. When more than one disorder is present, the effects on self-esteem are additive.

Personality (the Big Five)

The five-factor model of personality, commonly known as “the Big Five,” includes 5 broad personality domains:

conscientiousness (work ethic, organization);

agreeableness (kindness, empathy);

emotional stability (i.e., commonly referred to as neuroticism ) (composure, flexibility);

openness (curiosity, analytical thinking); and

extroversion (sociability, assertiveness).

Each domain represents a range between 2 extremes. For example, extroversion represents a continuum between extreme extroversion and extreme introversion, with ambiversion in the middle. Most people lie somewhere between the polar ends of each domain ( 17 ). The Big Five are not only universal, characterizing people across the world, they are also inheritable ( 17 ). Genetics influences 40 to 55% of personality.

Personality significantly determines the existence, nature, and outcomes of mental disorders. Neuroticism is the strongest correlate with mental disorders ( 18 ). High neuroticism is associated with the development of anxiety disorders, depression, substance abuse, psychosis, and schizophrenia, as well as general mental distress. Low extroversion (i.e., introversion) is associated with all common mental disorders, but most especially with social phobia, dysthymic disorder, depression, and suicidality ( 18 ). Low conscientiousness is associated with most of the common mental disorders ( 18 ). Agreeableness is negatively associated with substance abuse disorder ( 18 ). Openness is not associated with mental disorders ( 18 ).

Optimism, which is also a personality trait ( 19 ), is the tendency to anticipate favorable outcomes ( 20 ). Optimistic people tend to have more positive thoughts, be more hopeful, and view the future in a positive light. When a situation is neutral, an optimist will likely see it as positive, whereas a pessimist will likely see it as negative. Optimists are people who expect good things to happen to them; pessimists are people who expect bad things to happen to them. Genetics accounts for about 25% of a person’s likelihood of being an optimist or pessimist ( 19 ).

The ways in which optimists and pessimists differ in their approach to the world have substantial impact on their lives. Those who hold positive expectations for the future respond to difficulties in more adaptive ways than those who hold negative expectations. Because optimists expect good things to happen, they take active steps to make sure good things do happen. In fact, optimism is associated with taking proactive steps to protect health and well-being, whereas pessimism is associated with behaviors that damage health and well-being. As such, pessimists are more at risk for reduced quality of life and life satisfaction, anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, and suicide ( 19 , 20 ).

Minority group membership

A minority group is a category of people who experience relative disadvantage compared to that of a majority group. Minority group membership is typically based on differences in observable characteristics or practices, such as ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation, and ability. Minority group members often face discrimination, especially in housing, employment, healthcare, and education. Discrimination may be experienced through interpersonal interactions, but also through structural inequalities, wherein rights and opportunities are not equally accessible to all.

Minority group members are at risk for mental health problems because they face unique, chronic stressors as a result of their disadvantaged status in society ( 21 ). These stressors are experienced in addition to the usual stressors encountered by nonminority individuals. They may also be at risk because of a lack of awareness about mental health, cultural stigma surrounding health care, and inaccessibility of high-quality health care services. Mental health is a particular concern for members of sexual minority groups. Those belonging to a sexual minority are more likely to experience anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, eating disorders, substance abuse, self-harm, and suicidality ( 21 ).

Physical health

A clear distinction is often made between mental health and physical health, but the mind and body are inextricably entwined. Physical health problems can lead to mental health problems and vice versa . Those with chronic physical conditions (such as diabetes, heart disease, cancer, arthritis, and asthma) are especially at risk of developing mental disorders ( 22 ). They experience anxiety and depression at twice the rate of the general population. Co-existing conditions, whether mental illness secondary to physical illness or physical illness on top of mental illness, can reduce quality of life and lead to longer illness duration and worse health outcomes.

Learning about yourself

It’s the interplay of one’s genetic, psychological, and biological constitution along with the environmental conditions to which one is exposed that gives rise to the unique mental attributes that make each human being different from another. You, meaning your make-up and your life experiences, are one of a kind. The awareness of “who you are in your world” is the first step to be able to optimize your mental health. Optimizing your mental health will better enable you to live your best life.

In the past, debates over the relative contributions of nature and nurture often took a very one-sided approach, with one side arguing that nature was the most important while the other that nurture was the most important. Today, both are recognized to play critical roles in mental health, interacting in important ways throughout life. This article focused on the nature-related factors that can influence mental health. These are aspects intrinsically connected to the person, yet also, more often than not, influenced by the environment. The next article will focus on a range of nurture-related factors, meaning the exposures and experiences from conception onwards, that can influence mental health.

Use of this article is limited to a single copy for personal study. Anyone interested in obtaining reprints should contact the CVMA office ( [email protected] ) for additional copies or permission to use this material elsewhere.

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Nature-Nurture Debate

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• First Online: 02 February 2018
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• Christian Montag 3 , 4 &
• Elisabeth Hahn 5  

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Epigenome , Gene by environment , Intelligence , Molecular genetics , Nature , Nurture , Personality

Introduction

Among the earliest testimonials of human civilization is a deep intuition that some aspects of human behavior originate in our genetic makeup, while others feel like the result of upbringing or exercise. A central question posed by both ancient philosophers such as Aristotle and modern researchers in the twenty-first century deals with the impact of nature and nurture on human characteristics such as personality or intelligence. While Aristotle questioned how resemblances between parents and their offspring can be explained (Henry 2006 ), Sir Francis Galton ( 1869 ) as one of the first scientists already dealt in his famous work Hereditary Genius with the genetics of intelligence.

The nature versus nurture debate represents one of the oldest issues in the research of human behavior dealing with the question whether inherited traits or life experiences (e.g., upbringing)...

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Acknowledgment

The position of Christian Montag is funded by a Heisenberg grant awarded to him by the German Research Foundation (DFG, MO2363/3-2).

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Christian Montag

Key Laboratory for NeuroInformation/Center for Information in Medicine, School of Life Science and Technology, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China

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Montag, C., Hahn, E. (2018). Nature-Nurture Debate. In: Zeigler-Hill, V., Shackelford, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_822-1

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DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_822-1

Received : 09 August 2017

Accepted : 18 December 2017

Published : 02 February 2018

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Online ISBN : 978-3-319-28099-8

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